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Understanding  interbank  exposure  is the  key  to understanding  the  too  big 
to  fail  doctrine.  In  this  paper,  we  present  arguments  supporting  three 
principal  hypotheses:  high  levels of  interbank  exposure  reduce  the safety and 
soundness  of  the banking system;  interbank exposure  affects the abi l i  ty of  the 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation  (FDIC)  and  bank  regulators  to use market 
discipline  as  a  constraint  on  banks'  risk-taking;  and  a  rising  level  of 
interbank  exposure  is  indicative  of  reduced  stability  of  the  financial 
system.  In addition,  we  provide evidence  that  interbank exposure  does  not,  at 
this  time,  appear  to be  a  generalized  problem  for  U.S.  banks;  however,  some 
banks  in al  I  categories  of  asset  size st  i I  l  have  comparatively  high ratios of 
interbank  exposure  to capital, despite a general  decline  in these  ratios since 
the Continental  Illinois failure (1984). 
The  FDIC  alone  is not  to be  credited or  blamed  for  the  evolution of  the 
too  big  to  fail doctrine out  of  the  FDIC's  "essentiality"  doctrine:  that  is, 
"a  bank  that  is essential  could  not  be  allowed  to  fail  no  matter  what  the 
cost."  The  Federal  Reserve,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  large  U.S.  and 
foreign  banks,  and  politicians also deserve  a  share  of  the  credit or  blame. 
During Congressional  testimony  on  the  Continental  failure,  former  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency  Todd  Conover  "hinted  that  the  eleven  largest  banks  in  the 
nation  were  immune  from  failure."  One  of  the  principal  justifications 
offered by  FDIC officials for  the Continental  bailout was  the alleged  interbank 
exposure  of  2,300  other  banks  that  would  have  lost  more  than  the  insured 
amount  of their deposits  if  Continental had  been  closed without  a  full 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmguarantee  of  repayment  to  uninsured  claimants.  That,  in brief,  is how  the 
federal  bank'supervisory  authorities came  to find  themselves  embroiled  in the 
"disparate  treatment/too  big to fail" controversy  that still is unresolved. 
lnterbank  exposure  may  arise  from  normal,  effic'iency-promoting 
correspondent  banking  activities  that  are  not  inherently  dangerous  but  that 
may  become  so  if not  closely  monitored.  The  primary  focus  of  this paper  is 
overnight  or  term  interbank  exposure  that  is  directly  and  deliberately 
undertaken,  including  sales  of  federal  funds,  loans  to  depository 
institutions,  purchases  of  securities  under  agreements  to  resell  (reverse 
repos),  and  purchases  of  acceptances  of  other  banks.  Various  forms  of 
indirect  interbank  exposure  certainly  are  worth  studying,  but  information 
regarding  such  exposure  is difficult  to  capture  from  call  report  data;  thus, 
indirect  interbank  exposure  is  mentioned  only  occasionally  in  this  paper. 
However,  all forms  of  interbank  exposure  lie at  the  heart  of  the  too  big to 
fail doctrine.  lnterbank exposure  acts as  a  constraint  on  the  FDIC's  ability 
to  force  its  fellow  regulators  to  close  insolvent  banks,  which  provides 
disconcerting guideposts  as  to probable  future experience with cross-guarantee 
proposals  that  would  be  analogous  to  private  deposit  insurance  schemes. 
Market-oriented  corrective  measures,  such  as  market-value  accounting  for 
banks,  strictly  enforced  minimum  capital  standards,  per  customer  lending 
limits  applied  to  banks  as  well  as  nonbanks,  and  netting  out  interbank 
holdings  of  capital  instruments  in calculating  capital  adequacy  would  go  a 
long  way  toward  reducing  and  controlling  purported  systemic  failure  risk 
arising from  interbank exposure. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmPrefatory Quotations 
We  are  living  amid  the  vestiges  of  old 
controversies,  and  we  speak  their  language, 
though  we  are dealing with different  thoughts  and 
different facts. 
--  Walter  Bagehot, 
Lombard  Street , p.  161 (1873). 
History  is  a  good  teacher  but  there  are 
inattentive pupils. 
--  George  Stigler, quoted  in 
Harold Lever  and  Christopher 
Huhne,  Debt  and  Danaer,  p.  31 
(1986). 
[Former  FDlC  Chairman  William  M.  Isaac]  has 
doubts  about  the  [Con t i  nen  ta  l  I  rescue.  I' I  wonder 
if we  might  not  be  better  off  today  if we  had 
decided  to  let Continental  fail,  because  many  of 
the  large  banks  that  I  was  concerned  might  fail 
have  failed anyway,"  he  said.  "And  they  probably 
are  costing  the  FDlC  more  money  by  being allowed 
to  continue  several  more  years  than  they  would 
have had  they  fai  led  in 1984." 
--  William Isaac,  quoted  in Robert 
Trigaux,  "Isaac  Reassesses 
Continental  Bailout,"  American 
Banker,  p.  6  (July 31,  1989). 
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Former  FDlC  Director  lrvine Sprague  describes  the  origins of  the  too  big 
to  fail doctrine  in banking  as  follows.  The  text  refers  to a  May  17,  1984, 
FDlC  press  release  regarding  Continental  ll  linois  National  Bank  and  Trust 
Company  of Ch i  cago  ("Con t i  nen t  a I" : 
The  third  paragraph  caused  more  hassling  among  the  regulators 
themselves  and  with  the  banks  than  all the  rest  of  the  press  release  put 
together.  And  well  it should  have.  It was  the  essence  of  the  rescue. 
This  paragraph  granted  100  percent  insurance  to all depositors,  including 
the uninsured,  and  all general  creditors.  It read  as  follows: 
In  view  of  all  the  circumstances  surrounding 
Continental  Illinois  Bank,  the  FDIC  provides 
assurance  that,  in any  arrangements  that  may  be 
necessary  to  achieve  a  permanent  solution,  all 
depositors  and  other  general  creditors  of  the 
bank  will be  fully  protected  and  service  to  the 
bank's customers  will not  be  interrupted. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIts purpose,  quite bluntly, was  to stop  the  run 
and  prevent  recurrence.  We  had  to  have 
stability.  The  guarantee  was  extraordinary  but 
not  unprecedented.  We  had  given  similar  public 
assurances  to  buy  time  for  a  permanent  solution 
for  Greenwich  Savings  Bank  in New  York  City  in 
1981  and  for  the  United  Southern  Bank  in 
Nashv i l le,  Tennessee,  in  1983.  These  two  were 
also  granted  100  percent  insurance  by  press 
releases.  Only  the  Continental  guarantee, 
however,  touched  off  a  nationwide  debate  that  to 
this  day  continues  to  raise  questions  and 
generate controversy.  (Sprague  [19861,  p.  162). 
Sprague  added  that,  under  former  12  U.S.C.  Section  1823(c)(2),  the  FDlC  was 
authorized  to provide  open-bank  assistance  to any  fai ling insured bank  if its 
continued  operations  were  deemed  "essential  to  provide  adequate  banking 
service  in  its community."  More  I iberal  authority  for  the  FDlC  to  provide 
open-bank  assistance  was  not  enacted  until  the  Competitive  Equality  Banking 
Act  of  1987. 
The  first use  of  the  FDIC's  "essentiality"  doctrine occurred  in 1971,  to 
bail out  Unity Bank,  an  $11.4  million,  minority-owned  bank  in Boston  (Sprague 
[19861,  pp.  36-44).  The  size of banks  rescued  under  the  essentiality doctrine 
increased  through  the  $8  bi l l  ion  Fi  rst  Pennsylvania  case  in  1980  (Sprague 
[19861,  pp.  86-92)  and  eventually  the  $41  billion Continental  case.  Sprague 
notes  that  the  FDIC's  May  1984  assistance package  for Continental  was  based  on 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe  essentiality  test,  "so  presumably  a  bank  that  is essential  could  not  be 
allowed  to  fail no  matter  what  the  cost."  (Sprague  [19861,  p.  162).  Later, 
during  Congressional  testimony  on  the  Continental  fai lure,  former  Comptrol ler 
of  the  Currency  Todd  Conover  "hinted  that  the  eleven  largest  banks  in the 
nation were  immune  from  failure."  (Sprague  [19861,  p.  259).  That,  in brief, 
is  how  the  federal  bank  supervisory  authorities  came  to  find  themselves 
embroi led  in the  "disparate  treatmentltoo  big to fai I" controversy  that  sti  l l 
is unresolved. 
Interestingly,  this  modern  evolution  of  the  FDIC's  essentiality  doctrine 
created  a  situation  in  which  the  FDIC's  statutory  mandate  was  squarely 
contradicted: 
The  pendulum  has  swung  once  again  toward  100 
percent  protection  of  depositors  and  creditors. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Congress  made  it clear  in 
the  1950  Act  that  the  FDlC  was  not  created  to 
insure  all deposits  in all banks,  in  the  years 
since  Congress  has  gradually  increased  the 
insured  amount  to  $100,000.  In  addition,  the 
regulators  have  devised  solutions  that  protect 
even  the  uninsured  in the  preponderance  of  cases. 
(Sprague  [19861,  p.  32;  see  also,  Caliguire  and 
Thomson  [  1987 I  and  Penn i  ng  [ 1968 I  ) . 
The  FDlC  alone  is not  to be  credited or  blamed  for  this evolution of  the 
too  big  to  fail  doctrine.  During  the  First  Pennsylvania  rescue  (1980), 
Sprague  reports  that  "there  was  strong  pressure  from  the  beginning  not  to  let 
the bank  fai l  .  . .  [from]  the  other  large banks,  ..  . the  comptroller,  .  .  .  [and] 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfrequently  from  the  Fed."  (Sprague  119861,  p.  88).  The  following passage  is 
particularly  telling  in  regard  to  how  the  "domino  theory  of  banking" 
(precursor  of  too big to fai I) first appeared  in policy-making  circles: 
I  recall  at  one  session  [in  1980,  regarding 
First Pennsylvania],  Fred Schultz,  the  Fed  deputy 
chairman,  argued  in an  ever  rising  voice,  that 
there  were  no  alternatives -- we  had  to save  the 
bank.  He  said,  "Quit  wasting  time  talking about 
anything  else!"  Paul  Homan  of  the  Comptroller's 
office was  equally  intense  as  he  argued  for  any 
solution  but  a  fai lure.  The  domino  theory 
dominated  the  discussion --  if  First Pennsylvania 
went  down,  its business  connections  with  other 
banks  would  entangle  them  also  and  touch  off  a 
crisis  in  confidence  that  would  snowball  into 
other  bank  failures  here  and  abroad.  It would 
culminate  in an  international  financial  crisis. 
The  [domino]  theory  had  never  been  tested. 
(Sprague  [  19861 ,  pp . 88-89  . 
Foreign  observers  (British,  in  this  case)  clearly  assumed,  by  the 
mid-1980s,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Continental  rescue,  "that  the  Federal 
Reserve  will not  allow one  of  the  lynchpin  banks  to  fail."  (Lever  and  Huhne 
[1986],  p.  22).  Thus,  the  Federal  Reserve's  ever-looser  lender  of  last 
resort  policies  since  the  Franklin  National  Bank  failure  (1974)  reasonably 
might  be  viewed  as  one  of  the  principal  factors  in creating  the  too  big  to 
fail doctrine (Todd  11988aI;  Schwartz  [19871;  Spero  [1980]). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmSome  of  those  originally  involved  in the  creation  of  this doctrine  have 
come  to  repent  it, but  too  late  to do  the  taxpayer  much  good.  Politics,  not 
pure  economics,  is now  clearly  the  driving  factor  in preserving  the  doctrine, 
which  is generally  acknowledged  to stand  in the  way  of  both  the  expansion  of 
banks'  powers  and  the  reduction  of  taxpayers1  costs.  Former  FDlC  Chairman 
William  lsaac  has  been  quoted  as  saying  that  the  regulators  and  politicians 
probably  made  a  costly mistake  in trying  to save  Continental,  but  lsaac  also 
admits  that,  if he  were  Chairman  now,  he  would  be  trying to save  everybody  for 
political reasons,  regardless of cost,  just  like current  FDlC  Chairman William 
Seidman  (Trigaux  [19891). 
11.  Whv  the Too  Bia to Fail Doctrine Matters 
Imprecisely  defined  terms  and  policy  conceptions  that  are  not  rooted  in 
practical  reality  often  determine  official  decisions  regarding  banking, 
regardless  of  the  clarity  (or  lack  thereof)  of  the  terms  normally  used  in 
economists'  discussions  of  banking  theory.  Among  our  favorite  examples  of 
such  vague  or  unnatural  terms  and  conceptions  are  "lender  of  last  resort," 
"solvency,"  "liquidity,"  and  the  like,  at  least  as  those  terms  currently are 
used  in  the  pol icy  debate  (Thomson  119901 ; Todd  11988al).  Clarity of  terms 
and  precision of  historical  conceptions  do  matter,  as  does  the  legitimacy of 
the  line of descent  of  the  policy  in question.  Otherwise,  policy discussions 
regarding  banking  tend  to deteriorate  into  the  situation described  by  Joseph 
Schumpeter  (1950,  p.  340),  as  fol  lows: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm[Ilndividuals,  as  well  as  groups'  often  do  not 
know  where,  if  anywhere,  they  belong  and, 
-  sometimes  from  ignorance,  at  other  times  from  a 
correct  perception  of  advantage,  they  mix  up 
contradictory  principles  into  mongrel  creeds  of 
their  own.  All  this  confuses  observers  and 
accounts  for  the  wide  variety  of  current 
interpretations. 
Reversing  what  some  might  consider  normal  procedure,  we  explain why  the  policy 
discussion  of  the  too  big to  fai  1  doctrine matters  at  both macroeconomic  and 
rnicroeconomic  levels,  and  then  we  define a few  key  terms. 
The  conception  of  interbank  exposure  encountered  most  frequently  in policy 
discussions  is  the  reduction  of  risk  in Federal  Reserve-operated  and  some 
private-sector  payments  networks.  This  risk arises  from  intraday  or  daylight 
overdrafts  due  to  the  posting  of  debit  and  credit  entries  for  transfers  of 
funds  and  securities  over  those  networks.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  such 
transfers  arises  from  government  securities  and  foreign  exchange  trading 
activities.  The  volumes  of  these  transfers  in  recent  years,  $183  trillion 
over  Fedwire  (1989)  and  $32  trillion over  CHIPS  (19881,  have  dwarfed  the 
relevant  measures  of  real  economic  activity  ($5.2  trillion  of  U.S.  gross 
national  product  [I9891 and  $2.7  trillion of  gross  world  trade  [I9881  for  all 
countries).  A  variety  of  risk-reduction  measures  have  been  proposed  and 
implemented  in recent  years,  including  institution-specific  net  debit  and  net 
credit  limitations,  or  caps  per  sender,  and  the  planned  imposition  of  a  25 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbasis points per  annum  .fee  for  intraday overdrafts  on  Fedwire  in excess  of  10 
percent  of  each  sending  institution's  risk-adjusted  capital.  Because  most 
payments  network  transfers  are  initiated  by  or  paid  to  money  center 
institutions  that  are  clearing  or  settling  securities  or  foreign  exchange 
trades  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York  11987-8811,  the  15  or so  largest  U.S. 
banks  probably  will account  for  nearly  90  percent  of  the  planned  intraday 
overdraft  fees.  However,  trading  (and  the  magnitude  of  intraday  overdrafts) 
has  become  large  enough  to  create  Federal  Reserve  concern  only  since  the 
1970s.  The  failure of  Bankhaus  I  .G.  Herstatt  during  the  U.S.  banking  day  in 
1974  also  increased  regulatory  concern  regarding  intraday  interbank  exposure 
(Spero  [1980],  pp.  108-114).  Since  intraday  interbank  exposure  became  a 
significant  Federal  Reserve  concern  during  the  early  1980s,  it has  become  one 
of the driving factors behind  the  too  big to fail doctrine and  has  begun  to be 
addressed  by  specific  policy  initiatives (Stevens  [1989];  Aspinwall  and  Scott 
[I9891 ; Spero  [19801,  pp.  108-114). 
Interbank  exposure  also  may  arise  from  normal,  efficiency-promoting 
correspondent  banking  activities  that  are  not  inherently  dangerous  but  that 
may  become  so  if not  closely  monitored.  Clearing  or  other  correspondent 
balances  maintained  by  smal ler banks  at  large  regional  or  money  center  banks, 
or  even  by  larger  banks  that  are  not  members  of  the  same  clearinghouse,  may 
give  rise to  unexpected  credit  risk exposure  against  the  respondents.  Thus, 
checks  drawn  on  a  large  regional  bank,  accepted  for  deposit  at a small  bank  in 
the  same  region,  might  constitute  a  significant  risk  with  respect  to  the 
capital of  the  small  bank  if the  large  respondent  failed and  were  closed while 
in possession  of  the  small  bank's  checks,  before  the  failed  respondent  made 
final  settlement  for  those  checks.  Such  concerns  were  said  to  have  been  a 
factor  in the  FDIC's  and  Federal  Reserve's  decision  to  rescue  or  bail  out 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmContinental  in 1984.  Then,  as  during  Continental's  prior  rescue  by  the  old 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  in  1933,  Continen-tal  was  "a  great 
correspondent  bank  --  a  banker's  bank  --  in which  a  large  proportion  of  the 
count ry  banks  .  .  .  kept  accounts .  "  (Jones  [  1951  1 , pp . 47-49 ; Sp rague  [  19861 , 
pp.  250-251).  Of  course,  correspondent  banking  risk  runs  downh i l l  also: 
Cincinnati's  commercial  banks  refused  to  accept  for  deposit  checks  drawn  on 
closed  privately  insured  thrift  institutions during  the  March  1985  crisis  in 
Ohio  because  recovery  of  the  full value  of  those  checks  was  uncertain until 
the  thrift crisis  actually  began  to  be  resolved,  about  one  week  after  the 
systemwide  closing  began.  (See  Wolfson  [19861,  pp.  117-121;  Kane  [1988]; 
Federal Reserve Bank  of Cleveland Annual  Re~ort,  1985.) 
Neither  intraday  interbank  exposure  nor  correspondent  banking  risk  is the 
principal  focus  of  this  paper.  The  primary  focus  is,  instead,  overnight  or 
term  interbank  exposure  that  is  directly  and  deliberately  undertaken, 
including sales  of  federal  funds,  loans  to  depository  institutions,  purchases 
of  securities  under  agreements  to  resell  (reverse  repos),  and  purchases  of 
acceptances  of  other  banks.  In addition,  various  forms  of  indirect  interbank 
exposure  certainly are worth  studying,  but  information  regarding  such  exposure 
is  difficult  to  capture  from  call  report  data;  thus,  indirect  interbank 
exposure  is mentioned  only  occasionally  in  this  paper.  Indirect  interbank 
exposure  includes  loan  participations  purchased  (often  including  shared 
national  credits),  credits  extended  against  third-party  guarantees  (including 
bank-issued  guarantees  or  letters  of  credit),  and  risk  against  bank 
counterparties  on  foreign  exchange  contracts,  foreign  exchange  swap 
agreements,  interest-rate  swaps,  forward-rate  agreements,  etc.  Interbank 
exposure  also  can  arise  with  respect  t  o  int  raday 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmoverdrafts  or  correspondent  banking  activities  for  the  accounts  of  foreign 
banks,  both  in the  United States  and  abroad,  because  of cross-border  transfer 
risk.. 
Al  I  these  forms  of  interbank  exposure  lie at  the  heart  of  the  too  big to 
fail  doctrine.  Fears  of  retail  depositors'  "cash-over-the-counter"  runs  on 
banks  are  not  really  the  driving  factor  in  the  regulatorst  decisions  to 
protect  the  largest  banks  from  failure.  'That  is because  it  takes  a very  long 
time  to  count  and  disburse  large  amounts  of  cash.  In Ohio  in March  1985,  it 
was  unusual  for  any  one  banking  office to  be  able  to  pay  out  more  than  $1 
mill  ion  to $2  mi  l l ion of cash  to  retai  l  depositors  in a single day.  At that 
rate,  it would  take  up  to  43,000  banking-office  days  to  pay  off  the  $43 
billion of  domestic  deposits  of Citibank  (1989)  in cash  to  retail customers. 
The  real  danger  that  concerns  federal  regulators  is  institutional  or 
electronic  runs  on  banks.  When  funds  leave  a  bank  at  the  rate  of  from 
$100,000  to  $5  million per  electronic  transfer,  it then  becomes  possible  to 
empty  even  a  large bank  l ike  Ci  t ibank  (which  had  about  $115  bi  l l  ion of  total 
deposits at year-end  1989)  in only a day  or  two. 
Only  banks  normally  have  direct, on-line  access  to electronic  transfers of 
funds  over  Fedwire.  Banks  that  are not  members  of  the  same  clearinghouse  have 
a  further  incentive  to  remove  funds  electronically  at  the  first  sign  of 
trouble  because  Fedwire  transfers  are  final  when  received,  while  clearing- 
house  settlements  can  be  reversed.  Thus,  in the  last  15  years  or  so,  federal 
regulators  rationally have  worried  more  about  electronic  runs,  almost  always 
by  other  large  banks  (usually  foreign  banks,  at  that),  that  could  empty  big 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbanks  in a  single day.  Regulators  rationally worry  less  about  long  lines of 
nervous  retai l  claimants  waiting  for  their  money,  as  in Ohio  and  Maryland  in 
1985,  but  long  l ines  of  customers  attempting  withdrawals  (visible runs)  st i l l 
worry  bankers  and  politicians  enough  to  cause  them  to  pester  regulators, 
nevertheless. 
Because  Continental  was  the  turning point  at which  interbank  exposure  and 
the  too  big to  fail doctrine were  linked so  as  to become  one  and  the  same  in 
the  minds  of  bank  regulators,  it is appropriate  to close  this section of  the 
paper  with the  following passage,  again  from Sprague's  Bailout  (1986,  p.  248): 
Martin Mayer  .  . . argued  in a  Financier  article 
in  late  1985  that  the  FDI  Act  "almost  certainly 
does  not  permit  what  the  FDIC  did"  at 
Continental.  He  simply  did  not  accept  the 
attorney  general's  opinion  that  the  transaction 
was  legally structured.  Mayer  observed  correctly 
that  the  real  difficulty was  that  foreign holders 
of  debt  securities  and  commercial  paper  in the 
holding  company  wou Id  have  yanked  thei r  $17 
billion  in Eurodeposits  out  of  the  bank  if the 
securities  holdings  were  not  fully  protected  in 
the  bailout.  If  the  holding  company  was  not 
saved,  the bank  cou Id not  be  rescued. 
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discussions  of  interbank  holdings  of  bank  holding  company  commercial  paper, 
depos i  t  notes,  and  the  l i  ke . 
Ill.  Systemic  Risk and  Contagious  Bank  Runs 
The  risk  of  contagious  bank  runs  often  is discussed  as  a  public  policy 
concern  and  as  a  justification  for  the  too  big  to  fail  doctrine.  Most 
discussions  apparently  define  this  risk as  the  sensitivity of  one  bank  to  the 
failure  of  another  bank.  Although  that  sensitivity  may  be  indirect  (i.e., 
nervous  depositors,  noting the  failure of  one  bank,  run  on  another  bank,  even 
though  the  second  bank  still is solvent),  the  principal concern  of  this paper 
is direct  sensitivity (i.e.,  one  bank,  fearing  the  loss  of  its funds,  removes 
them  from  another  bank).  The  failure  or  suspension  of  one  bank,  or  of  a 
limited  number  of  banks,  arguably  was  an  event  that  could  have  caused  or 
contributed  to multiple  failures or  suspensions  in the  banking  system  in the 
pre-1933  era.  Significant  contagion  effects  of  that  type  would  have  public 
policy  implications  today  both  for  the  way  banks  are  regulated  and  for  the 
solvency  of  federal  deposit  insurance  funds.  Some  federal  regulators  and 
academ i  cs  a l  so  ca l l  this phenomenon  "sys tem i  c  r i  sku (Cor r i  gan  [  19901  ) . 
We  believe  that,  for  reasons  explained  below,  the  type  of  indirect  and 
irrational systemic  risk usually discussed  by  bank  regulators  today  to justify 
increased  regulatory discretion  in applying the  too big to fail doctrine never 
actually  existed  in  the  United  States,  except  possibly  during  the  Great 
Contraction  of  1929-1933.  Instead,  the  type  of  contagion  or  systemic  risk 
that  actually  has  existed and  still exists  is both direct  and  rational.  That 
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they  were  unlikely  to  recover  those  monies  and  therefore  might  attempt  to 
remove  great quan t i  t i  es  of  those  funds  elect  ron i  ca l ly (Thomson  [  19901 ; Kaufman 
[1988]).  In this paper,  we  use  the  term  "interbank  exposure"  to  refer  to such 
direct,  rational  contagion  or  systemic  risk,li  recognizing al  l  the  whi le that 
banks  can  fail for  a variety of  reasons  that  do  not  necessarily  have  anything 
to do  with  interbank exposure.  Rather,  our  point here  is that  it is interbank 
exposure  that  has  become  the  principal  rationale  for  the  too  big  to  fail 
doctrine,  while we  believe  that  interbank exposure  could and  should  be  reduced 
or  controlled  in  such  a  way  that  it no  longer  could  be  construed  as  a 
sufficient  justification  for  the  doctrine.  Market-oriented  corrective 
measures,  such  as  market-value  accounting  for  banks,  strictly enforced minimum 
capital  standards,  per  customer  lending  limits  applied  to  banks  as  well  as 
nonbanks,  and  netting  out  interbank  holdings  of  capital  instruments  in 
calculating  capital  adequacy  would  go  a  long  way  toward  reducing  and 
controlling alleged systemic  failure risk arising  from  interbank exposure.  If 
the  too  big  to  fail  doctrine  is  to  continue  to  be  the  guiding  light  of 
regulators,  then  let  it find something  besides  interbank  exposure  as  its main 
reason  for  being. 
Interbank  exposure  ordinarily  is thought  to rise to  the' level  of  contagion 
risk because  the  failure  of  one  bank  may  be  translated  into  losses  at  other 
banks  whose  asset  portfolios  include  claims  against  the  failing  institution. 
These  losses  could  be  large  enough  to  exhaust  the  claimant  bank's  capital, 
causing  it to  fail.  It is not  difficult  to  imagine  a  situation  in which  the 
failure of  one  medium-to-large  bank  could  result  in a  chain of  bank  failures. 
The  FDIC  used  this  very  argument,  after  al  I,  to  justify  the  Continental 
bailout  in 1984. 
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'The  remainder  of  this paper  .is organized  as  follows.  Section  IV presents 
a  brief  explanation  as  to  why  interbank  claims  exist  in our  banking  system. 
We  argue  that,  up  to  a  given  level  of  exposure,  the  efficiencies  gained  by 
correspondent  banking  relationships usually outweigh  the  associated  risks.  If 
properly  managed,  the  interbank  exposures  that  arise  out  of  correspondent 
banking  relationships  do  not  represent  a  serious  source  of  contagion  in the 
banking  system.  In  section  V,  we  look  at  the  implications  of  interbank 
exposure  for  the  continued  solvency  of  the  FDIC's  fund  as  a  constraint  on  the 
FDIC's  ability  to  close  insolvent  banks  and  as  a  guide  to  probable  future 
experience  with cross-guarantee  provisions  that  would  be  analogous  to private 
deposit  insurance  schemes.  Section  VI  presents  the  historical  relationship 
between  rising  interbank  exposure  and  financial  crises.  Section  VII gives  a 
rough  picture of  the  direction of  aggregate  interbank  exposure  for  U.S.  banks 
since  the  failure  of  Continental  Illinois.  We  present  our  conclusions  and 
policy suggestions  in section VIII. 
IV.  Correspondent  Banking and  Interbank Exposure 
Interbank  exposure  is defined  quantitatively,  for  the  purposes  of  this 
paper,  as  the  assets  one  bank  has  at  risk with  respect  to another  bank.  In 
th  is study,  the  i  nterbank-exposure  i  tems'  include  cash  i  tems  in the  process  of 
collection (CIPC),  balances  due  from  depository  institutions (BDDI),  loans  to 
depos i  tory  i  nst i  tut ions  (LDI 1,  acceptances  of  other  banks  (AOB) , and  federal 
funds  sold  and  securities  purchased  with  agreements  to  resell  (FFS).  We 
selected  these  items  for  our  study  because  they  are available  from  call  report 
data.  Recent  innovations  in  banking  may  have  created  new  categories  of 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfminterbank  exposure  that  should  be  included  in  future  studies,  but  those 
innovations,  such  as  interest-rate  and  currency  swaps,  are  either  poorly 
measured  by  pub1 icly avai lable data  (e.a.,  the data exist  only  as  measures  of 
undifferentiated  aggregate  exposure  to  both  banks  and  nonbanks)  or  are  not 
measured  at all.  Tables  following the paper  present  some  of  the  relevant  data 
for  correspondent  balances  and  off-balance-sheet  interbank exposures. 
The  first  two  interbank-exposure  items  listed,  ClPC  and  BDDI,  which 
comprise  variable  cash  and  balances  due,  arise out  of  correspondent  banking 
relationships.  Indeed,  it is likely that  correspondent  banking  is responsible 
for  the  lion's share  of  the  interbank  exposure  accounted  for  by  ClPC  and  BDDl 
and  at  least some  of  the  interbank exposure  represented by  LDI,  AOB,  and  FFS. 
Correspondent  banking  evolved  in the  earliest  stages  of  the  U.S.  and  U.K. 
banking  .systems  and  has  the  effect  of  arbitraging  away-  much  of  the 
inefficiency  of  a  unit  banking  system.2'  Correspondent  banking  is  less 
important  in  large,  nationwide  branching  systems  like  that  of  post-1920s 
Canada.  (See  Kryzanowsk i  and  Roberts  [  19891 .  In a  cor respondent  bank i  ng 
relationship  there  are  two  types  of  institutions:  correspondent  banks  (usually 
sma I I  banks)  and  respondent  banks  (usua I  Iy  large  banks).  The  re  lat  ionsh i  p 
allows  a  correspondent  bank  to  obtain  services,  such  as  check  clearing, 
secu r i  t i  es  safekeeping ,  and  computer  services ,  from  i  ts  respondent  bank  at  a 
lower  cost  than  would  be  incurred  if it performed  those  functions  itself. 
Federal  Reserve  Banks  compete  with  large  regional  and  money  center  banks  for 
such  correspondent  banking  business.  In  addition,  a  respondent  bank  can 
provide  its  correspondent  bank  with  a  source  of  increased  portfolio 
diversification  through  loan  participations.  Correspondents  often  place 
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onward  placement  of  surplus  funds)  via  sales  of  federal  funds  and  reverse 
repos.  In  -  return  for  the  services  provided  by  the  respondent  bank,  the 
correspondent  normally  keeps  noninterest-bearing  balances  at  its  respondent 
bank  as  a  form  -of  implicit  payment  for  the  services  that  it  receives. 
Correspondent  banks  also  keep  cash  balances  at  respondent  banks  that  provide 
their  check-clearing  services  as  a  reserve  account  against  (to)  which  the 
respondent  bank  can  debit  (credit)  checks  drawn  on  (payable  to)  the 
correspondent  bank. 
To  the  extent  that  interbank  exposure  arises  from  normal  correspondent 
relationships,  most  economists  assume  that  the  benefits  associated  with  the 
increased  efficiency  of  the  banking  system  outweigh  the  risks associated  with 
interbank  exposure.  Indeed,  if  properly  managed,  much  of  the 
interbank-exposure  risk faced  by  a  correspondent  bank  can  be  diversified away 
by  the  establishment  of  multiple correspondent  banking  relationships,  although 
in actual  practice  such  diversification of  risk might  prove  insufficient  if 
more  than  one  of  the  respondents  were  members  of  the  same  clearinghouse. 
Diversification  can  limit  the  exposure  of  a  correspondent  bank  to  any  one 
respondent  bank  and  can  reduce  the  replacement  costs  of  establishing  new 
correspondent  banking  relationships  if  one  of  the  respondent  banks  fails. 
V.  lnterbank Exposure and  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
lnterbank  exposure  can  increase  the  risk exposure  of  the  FDIC  in at  least 
two  ways.  First,  it reduces  the  independence  of  bank  failures.  That  is, 
interbank exposure  increases  the  probabi l i  ty  that  the  fai lure of  a bank  A  wi l  l 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbe  accompan i  ed  by  the  fa  i lure of  banks  B , C,  and  D.  Second,  i  t  reduces  the 
ability of  the  FDlC  to close  and  dispose  of  insolvent  banks  in a manner  that 
does  not  protect  shareholders  and  uninsured  creditors.  Most  interbank 
claimants  have  greater  amounts  at  risk  than  those  covered  by  the  nominal 
$100,000  of  federal  deposit  insurance.  As  in the  Continental  case  (1984), 
perceived  high  levels  of  interbank  exposure  can  create  pol it  ical  and 
regulatory  pressures  that  would  force  the  FDlC  to adopt  a  pol icy  of  ful l  or 
partial  forbearance  toward  a  failing  bank's  uninsured  creditors  and/or 
stockholders,  thereby  removing  depositors'  discipline  as  a  significant 
component  of market  discipline on  the  bank's  behavior  (Thomson  [1990]). 
If bank  failures  were  truly  independent  events,  the  risk exposure  of  the 
FDIC's  insurance  fund  from  any  single bank  failure would  be  the  expected  value 
of  losses  should  the  bank  fail, multiplied by  the  probability  that  the  bank 
would  fail.  That  is,  the  FDIC's  risk exposure  to the  bank  would  be  a  function 
of  the  riskiness of  the  bank.  However,  if contagion or  systemic  risk effects 
(such  as  interbank  exposure)  caused  bank  failure to be  a nonindependent  event, 
then  the  risk exposure  of  the  FDIC's  insurance  fund  with  respect  to any  single 
bank  would  be  a  function  of  both  the  riskiness  of  the  bank's  assets  and  the 
degree  of  interbank  sensitivity  within  the  banking  system.  In  such  a 
scenario,  the  cost  to  the  FDlC  of  bank  A's  failure would  have  to  include any 
losses  that  it would  incur  from  banks  that  went  under  as  a  result of  bank  A's 
fai lure.  3/  It is clear  that  interbank  exposure  increases  the  risk to the  FDIC 
from  a  single  bank  failure.  Because  contagion  effects  arising  from  direct 
interbank exposure  are one  form of  risk that  the  FDlC  cannot  diversify away  in 
its own  portfolio (it necessarily  is exposed  to  risks  from  the  failure of  any 
insured  bank),  interbank  exposure  may  increase  the  total  risk exposure  of  the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFDIC  to the  banking  industry  by  creating a  situation  in which  the  troubles  of 
one  bank  necessari ly and  directly are transmitted  to other  banks.4' 
The  second  undesirable  consequence  of  direct  interbank  exposure  is  its 
effect  on  the  FDIC's  capacity  to  dispose  of  fai  led  institutions  without 
extending  forbearances  to uninsured  creditors  and  stockholders.  Kane  (1989) 
presents a set  of four  constraints  that  often prevent  the FDlC  from  closing an 
insolvent  bank:  information  constraints,  staff  constraints,  the  implicit  and 
explicit  reserves  in  the  FDIC's  insurance  fund,  and  political  and  legal 
constraints.  It is clear  that  an  increase  in direct  interbank  exposure  would 
increase  the  severity  of  each  of  these  constraints.  For  example,  with  high 
levels  of  direct  interbank  exposure,  the  information  the  FDlC  would  need  to 
close  an  insolvent  institution would  have  to  include  the  condition  of  the 
institution and  the  impact  of  its failure on  other  banks. 
As  the  passages  from  Sprague  (1986)  in the  first sect ion  of  this  paper 
indicate,  Continental  (1984)  was  and  probably  still is the  leading  example  of 
how  interbank exposure  affected the way  a  failing bank  was  handled  by  the bank 
regulators.  In testimony  before  the House  Banking Committee's  Subcommittee  on 
Financial  Institutions,  Supervision,  Regulation,  and  Insurance,  then  FDlC 
Chairman  Wi l l iam  lsaac  stated  that  one  factor  that  prompted  the  bailout was 
the  FDIC's  concern  over  the  impact  Continental's  failure would  have  on  small 
banks  with  interbank  exposure  to  it.  Regarding  this  concern,  lsaac  states 
that: 
Hundreds  of  small  banks  would  have  been 
particularly  hard  hit.  Almost  2,300  small 
banks  had  nearly  $6  billion  at  risk  in 
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capital  on  the  line  and. another  113  had 
between 50  and  100 percent .s' 
But  was  Isaac's  statement  correct?  Later  analysis  showed  that  it was 
unlikely  that  more  than  a  dozen  or  so  banks  (all of  them  small)  would  have 
failed as  a  result  of  allowing Continental  to  fail.  In a  report  to the  House 
Banking,  Finance  and  Urban  Affairs  Subcommittee  on  Financial  Institutions, 
Supervision,  Regulation,  and  Insurance,  Congressional  staff  found  that,  if 
Continental  had  been  allowed  to  fail without  government  assistance,  and  even 
if Continental's  losses  totaled  60  percent  of  assets  (only  a  40  percent 
payment  to  uninsured  claimants),  then  only  27  banks  would  have  failed,  and 
only  56  banks  would  have  experienced  losses  between  50  and  100  percent  of 
their  capital.  Using  a  more  realistic  (but  still higher  than  apparently  is 
expected)  loss  rate  of  30  percent  of  Continental's  assets,  the  Congressional 
staff  found  that  only  six  banks  would  have  failed,  and  only  22  would  have 
experienced  losses  between  50  and  100  percent  of  their  capital .6' 
Nevertheless,  it is clear  from  the  passages  cited  from  Sprague  (as  well  as 
from  our  personal  memories)  that  the  regulators'  perception  of 
interbank-exposure  risk reduced  their  capacity  to dispose  of  Continental  in a 
manner  that  would  have  protected  only  the  10  percent  of  all depositors  who 
were  insured. 
VI. The  Historical Relationshit) Between  Risina  Interbank Exposure and 
Financial Distress 
We  are  unaware  of  any  study  that  indicates  that  rising  interbank  exposure 
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which  this  might  be  so.  However,  the  historical  evidence  suggests  that 
interbank  exposure  is a  leading  indicator  of  financial  distress,  a  sign  of 
overlending  perhaps  (what  Adam  Smith  and  Walter  Bagehot  called 
"overtrading").  Not  all  financial  panics  necessarily  have  been  preceded  by 
rising  levels  of  direct  interbank  exposure,  but  several  notable  instances  of 
increased  interbank exposure  were  followed  by  financial  panics.  The  liveliest 
sources  to read  on  this point  include studies by  Adam  Smith  (1976  ed.),  Walter 
Bagehot  (1873),  Charles  P.  Kindleberger  (1978),  and,  of  all people,  Herbert 
Hoover  (1952). 
Kindleberger,  Stephen  V.O.  Clarke  (1983),  and  Joan  Edelman  Spero  (1980), 
among  other  recent  writers,  consistently  have  identified  either  the  credit 
(asset)  or  funding  (liability)  risk  of  direct,  international,  interbank 
exposure  (or  both)  as  concerns  for  monetary  and  bank  supervisory  authorities. 
Clarke's  study  of  the  international  interbank  market  (1983,  pp.  43-48)  was 
prescient  regarding  both  the  efficiencies  and  myopic  tendencies  of  the 
interbank  funds  market.  He  proposed  the  creation  of  a  risk-related  private 
insurance  pool,  funded  by  banks,  that  would  replace the  initial involvement  of 
central  banks  as  lenders  of  last  resort  in  periods  of  interbank  payment 
difficulties.  Active  involvement  of  the  central  banks  would  be  reserved  for 
truly disastrous,  not  merely  difficult or  inconvenient,  periods  of  distress  in 
the  interbank market.  Adam  Smith,  Hoover,  Kindleberger,  Spero,  and  Clarke all 
described  direct  interbank  exposure  as  a  device  for  propagation  or 
transmission  of  financial  distress  from  one  bank  to  another  or  from  one 
financial  center  to another. 
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lenders  regarding  the  sustainabi l i  ty of  debt  service capacities  of debtors  as 
a  poss i  b l  e  exp l ana  t i  on  of  f requen t  over l  end i  ng  and  subsequent  econom i  c 
defaults  in contexts  analogous  to  the  developing-country  debt  problems  of  the 
1980s.  Lever  and  Huhne  (1986,  pp.  31-55),  Kaletsky  (1985),  and  Todd  (19891, 
among  others,  noted  this  same  myopic  and  amnesiac  quality  regarding 
international  lending,  with  particular  attention  to direct  interbank  exposure 
during  the  1920s  in Todd  (1989).  Chernow  (1990,  pp.  636-652)  describes  in 
detail  the  interesting cases  of  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  Bankers  Trust 
Company,  and  Citibank,  all of New  York,  in the  rolling over  and  rescheduling 
of  billions of  dollars of  credits  for  Brazil  (including  interbank  or  "Project 
IV"  credits)  after  1982.  Those  rollovers and  reschedulings  were  intended  to 
keep  alive the  fictions  that  U.S.  banks  could  ignore  lessons  of  the  past,  in 
both  Europe  and  Latin  America  (which  the  New  York  banks  particularly  should 
have  remembered),  and  that  commercial  banks  could  make  "good  loans"  to 
developing  countries  with  unstable  legal  and  political  environments  and 
clouded  future  repayment  prospects  (Chernow  [19901,  pp.  636-639;  Todd 
[1989]).  Wolfson  (1986,  pp.  102-105)  analyzes  the  emergency  measures  taken 
regarding  Mexican  credits  in  August  1982;  a  smaller  proportion  of  those 
credits were  interbank claims  than  in the  case  of  Brazil. 
In the  pre-Wor Id War  I I  era,  one  of  the  riskier  forms  of  direct  interbank 
exposure  identified  in  the  historical  literature  was  accommodation  paper. 
Accommodation  bi  l Is of  exchange  are  refinancing drafts drawn  by  one  bank  upon 
another  to  enable  the  first  bank  to  share  the  credit  risk  of  its customer 
(account  party) with another  bank  (the drawee  or  accepting  bank).  In the  more 
arcane  forms  of  accomnodation  or  refinancing  drafts,  the  drawing  bank's 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmunderlying customer  (account  party) may  also be  a  bank,  so  that  long chains  of 
accommodation  or  refinancing  paper  can  be  established.  It was  not  at  all 
unusual  to  -find  proposals  in  the  interbank.market  in  the  1980s  regarding 
accommodation  bills with  at  least  three  banks  linked  in a  chain  of  legal 
accountability  between  the  bank  with  the  ultimate  liability  and  asset 
exposures  in  the  United  States  (the  U.S.  accepting  bank)  and  the  original 
underlying  nonbank  customer  (if any)  in some  foreign  country  (Todd  [1988b]). 
Fortunately,  such  proposals  still are  the  exceptions,  not  the  rule,  in the 
U.S.  bills of exchange  (bankers'  acceptances)  market. 
While  most  international,  interbank claims were  concentrated  in London  and 
offshore banking havens  during  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  (Clarke  [1983]),  U.S. 
banking  offices  increased  their  direct,  international  interbank  exposures  for 
both assets  and  liabilities in recent  years.  However,  mid-year  1989  exposure 
Ieve  I  s  for  the  34  largest  U .S.  ho Iders  of  correspondent  balances  (demand 
deposits),  for example,  were  $9.3  billion, down  about  12  percent  from mid-year 
1988  levels  (American  Banker  [1990]).  International  interbank  claims  of  al  l 
types  on  U.S.  banks  by  unaffiliated  foreign  banks  rose  from  $120  billion at 
year-end  1988  to $135  bi l lion at year-end  1989  (Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  May 
1990,  table 3.17).  From  the  perspective of  borrowers  of  interbank credit, the 
amounts  involved can  become  quite  large:  Interbank  claims  of  all types  and  of 
al l  countries  on  Brazil  just  before  the  February  1987  one-year  moratorium on 
Brazi 1's  external  debt  were  reported  as  approximately  $35  billion,  then  about 
one-third  of  Brazil's  total  foreign  debt  and  about  12  percent  of  its gross 
domestic  product  (Batista 119881,  pp.  39,  191). 
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operations  of  chains  of accommodation  paper  in the  affairs of 'Scottish banks, 
particularly  the  Bank  of  Ayr,  which  failed  in 1772  after  two  years  of  such 
practices.  Essentially,  to meet  demands  upon  them  that  could not  be  met  from 
exist i  ng  resources,  Scott i  sh  banks  drew  accomdat  ion  drafts  on  London 
bankers.  When  the  Scottish  banks  no  longer  could  pay  or  roll over  maturing 
accommodation  drafts,  the  scheme  became  unraveled.  Smith  says  that  Itthe 
operations of this bank  [Ayrl  increased  the  real  distress  it  meant  to relieveff 
and  that,  even  had  it succeeded,  the  operation  "would  only  have  transferred a 
great  part  of  [the  capital  of  the  country]  from  prudent  and  profitable,  to 
imprudent  and  unprofitable undertakings." 
Kindleberger  (1978,  pp.  53-63)  describes  the  evolution  of  accomnodation 
paper  (or  finance  bills) in the  eighteenth century  as  follows,  and  his account 
is worth  restatement  here in extensa  for our  purposes: 
Bi l Is of  exchange  were  not  necessarily  drawn  each  time 
a  consignment  of  goods  took  place,  covering  the  exact 
amount  of  the  transaction.  In 1763,  in Sweden,  Carlos 
and  Claes  Gri l l  bil  Is on  Lindegren  in London  could  not 
be  identified  with  particular  shipments,  which  were 
often made  in rapid succession,  but  were  drawn  when  the 
f i  rm  needed  money,  general ly  for  remi t tances  to 
creditors.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  evolution  of 
accommodation  paper,  in which  the  credit  of  a  house  or 
individual  is  gradually  separated  from  that  of 
particular  transactions.  In the  end,  the  accommodation 
bill was  nothing more  than  an  IOU  or  promissory  note. 
Real  bills partisans,  like H.  Parker  Willis  ... were 
firmly  opposed  to  accommodation  paper  and  regarded 
commercial  bi  l Is  based  on  trade  as  [properly] 
self-liquidating .... 
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represented  by  the  bill to the debtor's wealth gets out 
of hand,  as  may  happen  in periods of euphoria.  Drawing 
of-  bills in chains  is evidently  infectious.  Described 
by  Adam  Smith  as  a  normal  business  practice  [in The 
Wealth  of Nations,  Book  I I, chapter  2,  pp.  327-3371  it 
can  easily be  overdone.  A  draws  on  B,  B on  C,  C on  D, 
and  so  on;  all increase  the  amount  of  credit available 
for  use.  The  vice  of  the  accommodation  or  finance 
bill, according  to  [R.  G.1  Hawtrey,  IThe Art  of Central 
Bankinq (1932)1,  is its use  "for  construction  of  fixed 
capital  when  the  necessary  supply  of  bonafide  long-run 
savings  cannot  be  obtained  from  the  investment 
market."  [Thus,  the  equivalent  practice  today  would 
be  the  use  of  short-term  interbank  borrowings  to 
support  long-term  lending  practices.]  He  claims  the 
system  was  particularly abused  in the  London  crisis of 
1866  [the  collapse of  Overend  Gurney]  and  the  New  York 
crisis  of  1907.  We  have  already  noted  that  the 
spectacular  fai lure of  the  de  Neufvi l les  in 1763,  which 
produced  panic  in  Hamburg,  Berlin,  and  (to a  lesser 
extent)  London  as  we1 l  as  Amsterdam,  was  the  result of 
the  unraveling  of  a  particularly  impressive  chain  of 
discounts.  If one  house  fails,  the  chain  collapses  and 
may  bring  down  good  names,  those  with  a  reasonable 
ratio  of  debt  to  capital,  as  well  as  bad.  With 
accommodation  bills,  traders  with  limited  capital  of 
their  own  are  able  to  acquire  the  use,  at  least 
temporarily,  of  large  volumes  of  borrowed  funds,  a  use 
they  may  try to  stretch  into  longer-term ....  In 1857, 
John  Ball,  a  London  accountant,  reported  knowing  firms 
with  a  capital  of  under  10,000  pounds  and  obligations 
of  900,000  pounds,  and  claimed  it  was  a  fair 
illustration  [of  accommodation  financing  used  to 
support  longer-term  lending] .... 
When  they  were  abused,  finance  or  accommodation  bills 
gave  rise  to  excessive  credit  expansion.  At  all 
stages,  fictitious names  were  introduced  into the  chain 
from  time  to  time,  to  improve  the  appearance  of 
creditworthiness.  From  time  to  time,  also,  such  bi  l Is 
were  written  for  odd  amounts,  to suggest  an  underlying 
commercial  transaction.  And  when  this was  done,  claims 
were  sometimes  made  ... that  the  banks  abroad  knew  it 
was  finance  paper  disguised  as  commercial  bills  [and 
thus  should  not  be  heard  to complain' when  the  practice 
co l lapsed]. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmHawtrey  (1932,  p.  129)  made  the  following  telling point about  accomodation 
or  finance  bi  l Is:  "The  real  point  is that  the  accommodation  bi l l  is a  sign 
of  distress-.  It  is not  drawn  to  supply  funds  for  the  acquisition  of  an 
asset,  but  to  make  good  a  deficiency  of  cash  due  to  disappointed 
expectat ions." 
Reviewing  the  theory  of  accommodation  financing  in  light  of  Smith's, 
Hawtrey's,  and  Kindleberger's  accounts,  we  see  that  it may  become  a 
dangerous  practice for  banks  in expansionary  times  to extend  credit  to other 
banks,  believing  themselves  to  have  behaved  in a  safe  and  prudent  manner 
because  the  extensions  of  credit  are  entirely  short-term  in nature.  (See 
Clarke  [1983].)  A  funding  gap  develops  because  the  borrowing  banks,  in 
turn,  finance  longer-term  loans  and  investments  with  the  proceeds  of  their 
drawings.  If large  credits  extended  by  the  ultimately  borrowing  banks  go 
bad,  as  happened  with  the  loans  participated  out  to  other  banks  by  Penn 
Square  in 1982,  the  participating banks,  such  as  Seafirst and  Continental  in 
that  case,  may  be  dragged  into severe  capital  impairment  or  even  insolvency 
by  the  collapse of  interbank  credits  (indirect,  in that  case)  that  they  have 
extended.2'  Accordingly,  it would  be  nothing  more  than  good  comon  sense 
for  bankers  and  bank  regulators  to  be  aware  of  the  nature  and  extent  of 
interbank  commitments,  both  direct  and  indirect,  as  well  as  the  extent  to 
which  banks  rely on  interbank  borrowings  as  significant sources of  funds. 
We  have  used  Smith's  and  Kindleberger's  examples  to  illustrate  the 
perils  of  the  variety  of  interbank  exposure  that  comprises  accomnodation 
paper.  However,  it  should  be  obvious  that  the  same  perils may  exist  for  any 
form  of  interbank extensions of  credit. 
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banks  in the  international  interbank  market  is in Clarke  (1983).  However, 
for  the  ultiinate historical  illustration of  what  could  happen  to  the  U.S. 
banking  system  if it became  too  exposed  to foreign  interbank  credits,  it is 
necessary  to turn to the  Memoirs  of Herbert  Hoover.  Hoover's  account  of  the 
international  payments  crisis during  the  summer  of  1931  shows  the  important 
role  played  by  accommodation  paper  and,  by  extension,  by  direct  interbank 
credit  exposure  in putting  the  international  financial  dominoes  so  close 
together  that  they  all had  to topple after Creditanstalt of  Vienna  suspended 
foreign  payments  in  the  spring  of  1931.  Hoover's  account  of  the  crisis 
begins,  in relevant  part, as  follows  (Hoover  [1952],  11  1,  p.  73): 
With  these  bank  closings  in central  Europe,  I  naturally 
wanted  to  know  if American  banks  had  any  loans  to or 
deposits  in  the  banks  of  this  crisis  area.  I  first 
telephoned  Henry  Robinson,  chairman  of  a  large 
California bank  [First National  Bank  of  Los  Angeles,  an 
ancestral  component  of  Security  Pacific],  who  had  had 
much  experience  in  international  banking.  He  told  me 
that  many  of  our  banks  had  bought  German  trade  bills 
and  bank  acceptances,  both  60  and  90-day  paper.  The 
trade  bills were  supposed  to  be  secured  by  bills of 
lading  covering  goods  shipped,  and  to  be  payable  on 
delivery  of  the  goods.  The  bank  acceptances  were 
simply  "kited"  bills without  any  collateral.  Robinson 
expressed  great  alarm. 
We  be l i  eve  that  what  Hoover  meant  i  n  that  passage  i  s  that  Robinson  was 
expressing  discomfort  because  U.S.  banks  had  been  extending  direct  interbank 
credit  to  German  and  other  central  European  banks  via  accomnodation  paper 
without  verifying  independently  the  European  banks1  assumption  that  there 
really were  underlying trade  transactions  to support  the  volume  of  refinancing 
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acceptances  or  finance  bills that  the  banks  of  central  Europe  were  drawing 
on  U.K.  and  U.S.  banks.  As  Hoover's  account  later  shows,  the  volume  of 
refinancing  bills drawn  greatly  exceeded  the  actual  volume  of  underlying 
trade  transact ions.  The  drawing  banks,  in the  fashion  described  above  by 
Kindleberger,  resorted  to  accomnodation  paper  whenever  they  needed  funds, 
even  though  'there  were  no  trade  transactions  to  support  their  drawings. 
While  it  would  have  been  illegal under  U.S.  law  for drawing banks  to fail to 
disclose  that  their  drafts were  not  actually  connected  to  particular  trade 
transactions,  this  practice would  not  necessarily  have  created  a  financial 
crisis  if the  central  European  banks  had  had  the  capacity  gradually  to 
reduce  and  ultimately to repay  the  refinancing bills they  drew,  or  if  there 
had  been  no  precipitating  factor  causing  extensive  presentment  for  payment 
of  finance  bills  drawn  by  central  European  banks  instead  of  routine 
renewal.  Regrettably,  neither  solution  was  viable  because  the  volume  of 
bi  l Is  drawn  so  far  exceeded  the  value  of  al  l  central  European  export 
accounts  receivable  that  it was  inconceivable  that  the  eventual,  normal 
operations of  international  trade  would  have  enabled  the  finance  bills to be 
repaid.  For  example,  German  gross  exports  during all of  1931 were  only $1.9 
billion,  and  the  export  surplus  was  only  $650  million (Schuker  [1988],  p. 
45).  The  precipitating  factor  causing  presentment  for  payment  was  that 
French  banks,  acting  with  the  encouragement  of  the  French  government  for 
domestic  political  reasons,  began  to  redeem  all  their  holdings  of 
accomnodat ion  paper  issued  by  German  and  Austrian  banks  to  protest  the 
formation  of  a German-Austrian  customs  union  in the  spring  of  1931.  Thus, 
with  the  central  banking  resources  available  at  the  time,  there 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwas  no  way  to  avoid  the  crisis  through  the  normal  operations  of  the 
international  interbank  market.  (See  Clarke  [1967],  pp.  177-201;  Clay 
Continuing  his account  of  the  1931  crisis,  Hoover  writes  as  follows 
I  at  once  inquired  of  Federal  Reserve  officials what 
amounts  of  these  bi  l Is  [the  kited  or  interbank 
accommodation  acceptances]  were  held  by  American  banks 
and  business  houses.  After  some  inquiry,  they  informed 
me  that  our  banks  held  only  $400  mi  I  lion  or  $500 
million of  them  and  that  they  could  be  easily handled. 
[No tw i  t  hs  tand i  ng  the  assurances  of  Federa l  Reserve 
officials,  those  amounts  were  real money  in those  days, 
approximately  one-half  of one  percent  of gross  national 
product].  Worrying  over  the  matter  during  that  night, 
I  was  somehow  not  satisfied with  this  report,  and  in 
the  morning  I directed  the  Comptrol ler of  the  Currency 
to secure  an  accurate  report  on  such  American  holdings 
direct  from  the  banks.  Twenty-four  hours  later  I 
received  the  appalling  news  that  the  total  American 
bank  holdings  probably  exceeded  $1.7  billion;  that 
certain  banks  having  over  one  billion  dollars  of 
deposits held amounts  of  these  bills, which,  in case  of 
loss,  might  affect  their  capital  or  surplus  and  create 
great  public  fears.  [Without  his  naming  them,  we 
assume  that  President  Hoover  was  referring  to  the  New 
York  Clearing  House  banks.]  Here  was  one  consequence 
of  the  Reserve  Board  maintaining  artificial  ly  low 
interest  rates  and  expanded  credit  in  the  U.S.  from 
mid-1927  to  mid-1929  at  the  urging  of  European 
bankers.  Some  of  our  bankers  had  been  yielding  to 
sheer  greed  for  the  six  or  seven  percent  interest 
offered by  banks  in the European  panic area. 
New  York  rates  for  commercial  loans  rose  from  4.5  to 6  percent  during  those 
two  years.  Hoover  means  that,  using  the  rationales  usually  offered  for 
expanded  di  rect  interbank  credi  ts,  bankers  seeking  a  higher  rate of  return 
than  is available  through  normal  domestic  extensions  of  credit  to  nonbank 
customers  may  resort  to  direct  interbank  extensions  of  credit,  including 
foreign  interbank  credits.  Hoover  continues  as  follows (1952,  11  1,  p.  74): 
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European  banks  were  al  ready  in default  on  many  bank 
acceptances  and  were  frantically  endeavoring  to secure 
renewals.  He  thought  the  acceptances  comprised  a major 
part  of  American  bank  holdings  and  informed  me  that 
some  of  the  "trade  bil  Is"  did not  have  the  collateral 
documents  attached. 
One  of  the  con  t ro I dev i  ces  for  prevent i  ng  naked  accommoda t i  on  acceptances  o  r 
finance  bills from  entering  the  market  is to require the  attachment  of  bills 
of  lading or  detailed descriptions of  the  underlying  trade  transactions  that 
support  the  drawing  of  the  drafts.  This  has  been  traditional  market 
practice for  centuries,B1  but  in periods  of  euphoria,  not  unlike  the  1980s. 
sound  market  practice  is abandoned,  and  it becomes  not  at  all unusual  to 
find U.S.  banks  accepting drafts drawn  on  them  by  foreign  banks,  ostensibly 
to support  underlying trade  transactions on  the  books  of  those  foreign  banks 
--  transactions  that  are  not  disclosed  in full to the  credit-extending  U.S. 
banks.  Similarly,  interbank  credit  extensions  in  other  forms  (such  as 
Eurodollar  placements)  might  be  obtained  by  borrowing  banks  ostensibly  for 
the  purpose  of,  supporting  their  own  extensions  of  trade  credit,  but  it 
should  be  apparent  that  such  borrowings  could  be  used  merely  to  cover 
funding  shortfalls  that  otherwise  would  cause  the  closing of  the  borrowing 
insolvent  foreign  institutions.  Hoover  continues  (1952,  111,  p.  74): 
When  the  Comptroller's  information  began  to  come  in,  I 
sent  for  [Under]  Secretary  [of  the  Treasury  Ogdenl 
Mills who  was  also  fearful,  and  requested  him  to  ask 
his  friends  in  the  Bank  of  England  by  telephone  what 
they  knew  about  the  volume  of  these  bills.  In a day  or 
two  they  replied,  in alarm,  that  there  might  be  $2 
billion  in  the  banks  of  Britain  and  the  Dominions, 
together  w i  t  h  Sweden,  Norway ,  Sw i  t  ze r I  and,  and 
Denmark.  They  also  stated  that  there  were  quantities 
in  Latin  American  and  Asian  banks.  They  said  the 
German  and  other  eastern  European  banks  were 
frantically  trying  to  renew  the  bank  acceptances  and 
were  being  refused. 
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and  other  eastern  European  count r ies  had  as  much  as  $5 
billion of  these  short-term  bills afloat.  The-  Germans 
had  also,  over  the  years  since  the  war,  floated  many 
long-term  loans  by  their  government,  their 
municipalities,  and  their  business  houses.  It  looked 
as  if the  German  total  external  debt 'alone,  excluding 
reparations  but  including  long-term  debt,  might 
possibly  exceed  $5  billion.  They  not  only had  paid all 
their  reparation  installments  to the  allies out  of  this 
borrowed  money,  but  had  paid  for  reconstruction  of 
German  industry  and  their  budget  deficits.  It  was 
obvious  that  they  and  the  others  could  not  meet  their 
short-term  obligations,  at  least  for  the present. 
For  reference,  $5  billion in 1931  would  have  represented more  than  5  percent 
of  U.S.  gross  national  product,  would  have  been  approximately  one-and 
one-half  times  total  federal  budget  outlays,  and,  in the  case  of  Germany, 
would  have  represented  at  least  seven  years  of  that  country's  trade 
surpluses  plus  net  capital  inflows,  excluding  debt  service  on  official 
borrowings,  reparations  payments,  and  capital  flight.  Hoover  continues 
Thus,  the  explosive  mine  which  underlay  the  economic 
system  of  the  world  was  now  coming  clearly  into view. 
I  t  was  now  evident  why  the  European  cr  is  is had  been  so 
long delayed.  They  had  kited bills to A  in order  pay  B 
and  their  internal deficits. 
I  don't  know  that  I  have  ever  received  a  worse  shock. 
The  haunting  prospect  of  wholesale  bank  failures  and 
the  necessity  of  saying  not  a  word  to  the  American 
people  as  to  the  cause  and  danger,  lest  I  precipitate 
runs  on  our  banks,  left me  little  sleep. 
The  situation  was  no  longer  one  of  helping  foreign 
countries  to the  indirect  benefit of everybody.  It was 
now  a question of saving ourselves .... 
I  cabled  Secretaries  [Henry]  St imson  [State]  and 
[Andrew]  Me1 Ion  [Treasury]  my  plan,  which  was  for  a 
s  tand-s t i I I  agreement  among  a l  I  banks  everywhere 
holding  German  and  central  European  short-term 
obligations.  As  my  cable  outlining  the  plan  might 
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to  fire further  alarms  as  to  the  already  tense  central 
European situation. 
Hoover's  cable,  as  he  put  it, was  far  more  optimistic  about  Germany's 
abi lity to  pay  than  Hoover's  private  belief  indicated.  Hoover  says  that 
Secretaries  Stimson  and  Mellon  were  more  pessimistic  than  he.  However, 
Stimson  and  Mellon  also  urged  Hoover  to  agree  to  a  French  proposal  for  a 
$500  million emergency  loan  to Germany  from  the western  governments.  Hoover 
replied as  follows  (1952,  111,  pp.  77-78): 
I  replied  that  this was  a  banker  made  crisis,  and  that 
the  bankers  must  shoulder  the  burden .of  the  solution, 
not  our  taxpayers;  moreover,  that  the  amount  proposed 
would  not  be  a  drop  in  the  bucket  [compared  to  the 
amount  actually  needed  to  refund  the  entirety  of  the 
German  external  debt].  It was  merely  a  partial  re1  ief 
of  banks  at  government  expense.  Or  even  if a  loan  to 
Germany  was  provided  by  American,  British,  and  French 
and  other  banks  themselves,  it  [still]  would  be  a 
wholly  inadequate  solution.  1  again  informed  them 
[Stimson  and  Mel Ion]  by  telephone  in  detai l  of  the 
situation  as  to  German  and  other  central  European 
short-term  obligations  in the  U.S.  and  abroad.  I  also 
stated that  such  a  loan  would  not  even  take care of  the 
American  situation alone  [that  is,  maintaining  current 
payment  status on German  obligations  to U.S.  banks]. 
At this point  I  instructed Mr.  Mi  l Is to ask  a  friend  in 
the  Bank  of England  by  telephone  what  their  idea was  of 
the  French  proposal.  He  quickly  learned  that  the  Bank 
of  England  did not  approve  of  such  a  loan.  Also,  the 
British treasury  officials had  no  faith  that  it would 
meet  the  crisis.  The  affair began  to take  the color of 
the  usual  attempt  of  European  political  officials  to 
make  us  the  first  to  refuse  to  do  something  and 
therefore  the  scapegoat  for  anything  that  happened. 
Indeed,  one  reason  given  to me  by  Messrs.  Stimson  and 
Mellon  for  American  governmental  support  of  a  loan  was 
fear  of  just  that.  I  finally  telephoned  them 
emphatically  that  we  would  not  participate  in such  a 
loan  and  that  I  was  publishing  the  gist  of  the 
stand-still  proposal  to  the  world  that  very  minute. 
They  protested  against  the  publication  as 
undiplomatic.  I  issued  it  nevertheless. 
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meeting  in  London],  with  the  now  public  proposal  in 
front  of  it,  adopted  the  essence  of  my  plan  and 
delegated  the  Bank  for  lnternat  ional  Sett lements  at 
Berne  to carry  it out.  Its success  depended  on  bankers 
of  all  countries  holding  the  bills  [the  frozen 
interbank  or  refinancing  bills drawn  by  the  central 
European  banks]  and  agreeing  further  that  they  would 
accept  pari  passu  payments  on  unsecured  bills when 
payment  could  be  extracted  by  the  Bank  for 
International Settlements. 
A  group  of  ou'r  New  York  banks  informed  me  that  they 
could  not  agree  to  the  stand-still  plan  and  that  the 
only  solution was  for  our  government  to  participate  in 
a  large  international  loan  to  Germany  and  other 
countries.  My  nerves  were  perhaps  overstrained when  I 
replied that,  if they  did not  accept  within 24  hours  I 
would  expose  their  banking  conduct  to  the  American 
peop l  e  .  They  ag reed. 
Strange  behavior  for  an  unquestionably  conservative Republican  president 
from  California  toward  the  New  York  banks  in  light  of  more  recent 
iterations!  Hoover  says  further  that,  a  year  later,  the  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  (BIS)  made  a  retrospective  study  of  the  central 
European  bi  l Is of  exchange  problems  and  estimated  that  the  total problem was 
far  larger  even  than  Hoover  had  imagined  it.  The  BIS study,  as  described  by 
Hoover,  said  that  the  total  amount  of  short-term  international  private 
indebtedness  that  existed at the beginning of  1931 was  more  than $10  billion. 
At  ~t  time  the  magnitude  of  indebtedness  was  not 
known  . . .  cent ra  l  banks  began  to  real i  ze  .  . .  a  danger 
and  they  endeavored  ... to strengthen  their  reserves of 
foreign exchange.  . . .  The  menace  . .  . did not  appear  as 
self-evident  as  it does  today.  ...  It was  ... almost 
certain  to  break  the  situation  at  some  point.  The 
liquidation  in a  single  year  [was]  of  more  than  six 
billion of  short-term  indebtedness  ... of  the  balance 
.  .  .  still outstanding,  a  substantial  amount  has  in 
fact  become  b  locked .  (Omissions  in  original). 
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that  a  half a billion of government  money  [for  the  proposed official  loan  to 
Germany]  would  have  been  only  a  drop  in [this $10  billion] bucket."  (1952, 
Ill,  p. 79). 
Despite  his  understanding  of  the  dangers  of  increased  international 
interbank  exposure  to  the  American  banking  system,  Hoover  nevertheless 
approved  two  large  private  bank  loans  to  support  the  parity of  the  pound 
sterling  at  or  near  $4.86  in  the  summer  of  1931.  On  August  1,  Hoover 
approved  a $250  mi l l ion  loan,  and  on  August  26,  U.S.  banks  lent another  $400 
million  to  the  Bank  of  England  (Hoover  119521,  Ill, pp.  81-82).  Hoover 
should  have  learned  his  lesson  from  the  central  European  experience  earlier 
that  summer.  Ultimately,  the  Bank  of  England  suspended  redemption  of 
international  payments  of  gold  on  September  21,  1931.  Thus,  on  top  of  the 
central  European  interbank  credit  problem,  Hoover's  acquiescence  in private 
bank  lending  to  the  Bank  of  England  resulted  in an  additional  $650  million 
do1 lars  of  credit  exposure  (about  0.7  percent  of  U.S.  gross  national 
product)  that  had  little or  no  value  for  enabling  U.S.  banks  (principally 
the money  center  banks)  to meet  claims on  them  from domestic  sources. 
In  the  fall of  1931,  following  the  suspension  of  gold  payments  by  the 
Bank  of  England,  Hoover  gathered  leaders  of  the  banking  and  insurance 
industries  in  Washington,  together  with  some  cabinet  officials  and 
congressional  leaders,  and  proposed  the  creation  of . the  National  Credit 
Association.  The  Association,  which  was  similar  in concept  to the currently 
discussed  cross-guarantee  or  private  deposit  insurance  schemes,  was  to  be 
funded  with  an  initial  capital  contribution  of  $500  mil  lion  from  U.S. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbanks.  The  banks  were  to  use  that  capital  pool,  together  with  potential 
borrowing authority  for  the Association of $1  bi  l  lion more,  to make  loans  to 
support  troubled  financial  institutions  in  the  United  States  (Hoover 
[1952],  Ill, pp.  84-88).  However,  as  Hoover  later  notes  (1952,  Ill, pp. 
107-Ill),  the  banking  situation  in  this 'country  became  so  fearful  in the 
winter  of  1931-32  that,  after  a  few  weeks  of  effort,  the  National  Credit 
Association  died,  and  bankers  asked  for  direct  federal  help.  In January 
1932,  Hoover  requested  creation  of  the  new  Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation  to  take  over,  under  federal  auspices,  the  "extended  liquidity 
support"  role  of  the  National  Credit  Association.  (See  Jones  [1951].) 
There  still was  no  solvency  or  capital  support  lender  at  the  federal  level 
(Todd  [  1988a  1  ) . 
The  historical  record shows  us  that  direct  interbank  lending can  perform 
a  useful  function  in channeling  funds  more  efficiently  from  areas  of  low 
loan  demand  to  areas  of  high  loan  demand,  when  such  a  system  is managed 
prudently.  The  record  also  shows  that,  in periods  of  monetary  and  credit 
expansion,  it becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  bankers  to  restrain  their 
enthusiasm  for  lending,  including direct  interbank  lending,  so  as  to remain 
within  the  limits of  prudence  and  common  sense.  Upon  occasion,  overexposure 
to  direct  interbank  credits  arises,  and  then  disaster  follows  inevitably, 
albeit  with  the  delay  necessary  for  the  discovery  of  the  nature and  extent 
of  the  problem  (two  years  in the  case  described  by  Smith,  up  to four  years 
after  the  onset  of  expanded  direct  interbank  lending  in the  case  described 
by  Hoover).  Increasing  interbank  exposure  probably  is  an  early  warning 
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circumstances,  be  a  principal  cause  of  the  kinds  of  contagion  or  systemic 
risk  that  many  bank  regulators cite as  justification for creation of  the  too 
big  to  fail  doctrine.  The  point  those  regulators  conveniently  ignore  is 
that,  without  direct  interbank  lending,  it  usually  is difficult for  any  bank 
to become,  or  to long  remain,  too  big to fail. 
VII.  A  Measure of  Interbank Exposure 
The  measures  of  interbank exposure  that  can  be  constructed  from  publicly 
avai lable  data  are  flawed  in many  ways.  Currently,  it is not  possible  to 
construct  measures  of  interbank  exposure  that  include  all of  the  relevant 
sources  of  such  exposure.  In addition,  for  the  interbank-exposure  items 
that  can  be  constructed,  the  data  are  highly  aggregated,  thereby  making  it 
impossible  to  derive  an  accurate  measure  of  an  individual  bank's  risk. 
Therefore,  this exercise  in measuring  interbank  exposure  is performed  with 
three  purposes  in mind:  1)  to demonstrate  how'  one  would  go  about  measuring 
interbank-exposure  risk,  2)  to obtain an  overall  impression of  the  level  and 
direction of  aggregate  interbank  exposure  for  U.S.  banks,  and  3)  to  point 
out  the  glaring deficiencies  in the  data  available to construct  measures  of 
interbank-exposure  risk. 
The  data  used  in  the  study  are  taken  from  the  Federal  Financial 
Institutions Examination  Council's  (FFIEC's)  Reports  of Condition  and  Income 
(call  reports)  from  March  1984  through  March  1990.  This  sample  period was 
chosen  for  two  reasons:  1)  there  was  a major  revision of  the  call  reports 
i  n  March  1984  and  2)  because  interbank  exposu re 
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interested  in the  direction of aggregate  interbank  claims  since  that  time. 
After  all,  it would  hardly  be  a  triumph  of  logical  consistency  for  the 
authorities  to have  breached  precedent  by  bailing out  Continental  due  to  its 
interbank  exposure  and  then  to  do  nothing  about  discouraging  or  reducing 
interbank exposure  generally  in the  aftermath of  the  bai lout -- but  we  fear 
that  such  inaction and  inconsistency  is exactly what  is still happening. 
The  banks  in the  sample  are grouped  into five subsamples  on  the basis of 
size,  as  measured  by  total assets:  banks  with  less  than  $100  million;  banks 
with  at  least  $100  mill  ion  but  less  than  $300  mi l lion;  banks  with at  least 
$300  mi l  lion but  less  than  $1  bi  llion;  banks  with at  least  $1  bi  I1  ion  but 
less  than  $10  bi I  l ion;  and  banks with more  than  $10  bi  l l  ion. 
To  measure  interbank  exposure,  we  selected  five categories of  interbank 
risk:  CIPC,  BDDI,  LDI,  AOB,  and  FFS.  We  also  looked  at measures  of  inter- 
bank  exposure  to  foreign  banks  (FOR)  and  to  banks  domiciled  in  foreign 
countries  (ABR).  A  brief  description  of  these  variables  is  presented  in 
table  1.  Our  measure  of  total  interbank  exposure,  TOTEXP,  is  not  an 
all-inclusive  measure  and  omits  potentially  important  sources  of  interbank 
exposure,  such  as  stock  and  subordinated  debt  of  other  banks  and  loan 
participations  sold  with  recourse.  These  and  other  possible 
interbank-exposure  items were  omitted because  they  are not  readily available 
to  us  from  our  data  source. 9'  Despite  the  fact  that  we  missed  some 
interbank-exposure  items,  we  believe  that  TOTEXP  picks  up  the  majority of 
interbank  exposure  in the  asset  portfolio.m'  '  We  also  recognize  that  the 
same  criticism applies  to  FOR,  our  measure  of  exposure  to  non-U.S.  banks 
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banks domiciled  in foreign countries (both U.S.  and  non-U.S.  offices). 
We  construct  the  variables  in table  1  for  the  entire  sample  and  each 
subsample  (except  for  FOR  and  ABR)  because  of  different  reporting 
requirements  for  different  size  banks.  These  variables  generally  can  be 
constructed  only  for  banks  with  more  than  $100  million  in assets.  The 
variables are constructed  in two  ways:  1)  at  the  individual  level  and  2) at 
the  group  level.  The  final  variables  are  constructed  as  ratios of  exposure 
to  capital  because  the  ultimate  risk that  we  are concerned  with here  is the 
risk of  capital  impairment  due  to  interbank  exposure.  The  group  aggregate 
interbank-exposure  ratios are  plotted out  over  the  sample  period  in figures 
1 through  8.  The  individual  interbank-exposure  ratios are used  to construct 
tables 4 through  11. 
Figure 1 shows  that  the  ClPCC  exposure  of U.S.  banks  has  been  relatively 
flat since  the  Continental  Illinois crisis.U1  These  results are  confirmed 
at  the  individual  bank  level  in table 4.  For  example,  in March  1984,  22.07 
(11.66)  percent  of U.S.  banks  had  ClPCC  exposure  exceeding  50  (100)  percent 
of  capital,  while  in March  1990,  23.92  (11.18)  percent  of  U.S.  banks  had 
ClPCC  exposure exceeding 50  (100)  percent  of capital. 
Figure 2 shows  that  the  BDDlC  exposure  of  U.S.  banks  with more  than  $10 
billion in assets  fell  from  March  1984  through  December  1986.  Then  BDDIC 
for  these  banks  increased  dramatically,  with  a  general  decline  thereafter. 
BDDlC  generally  declined  for  all other  banks  (those with assets  of  less  than 
$10  bi  l l ion)  from  March  1984  to March  1990.  The  individual  bank  statistics 
in table  5 general ly confirm  the  aggregate  pattern of  exposure  in figure 2. 
Overal l  BDDl  exposures  are  high  enough  at  a  number  of  banks  in each  size 
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Figure  3  and  table  6  show  the  pattern of  LDI  exposure  for  U.S.  banks. 
Looking  at  f i$ure  2,  we  can  see  that  LDlC  is highest  for  the  largest  banks 
and  lowest  for  the  smal lest  banks.  From  March  1984  unti l  March  1990,  LDlC 
has  remained  fairly constant  for  banks  with assets  less  than  $1 bi  l l  ion and 
has  fa1 len  for  banks with assets greater  than $1  bi  l l  ion. 
Figure  4  and  table  7  show  the  changes  in the  interbank-exposure  ratio 
AOBC  over  the  sample  period.  For  all  of  the  bank  groups,  AOBC  is  a 
relatively  unimportant  source  of  interbank  exposure.  AOB  is  less  than  10 
percent  of  capital  for  every  aggregate  group  in every  quarter  and  was  lower 
in March  1990  than  it  was  in March  1984  for  each  group.  However,  table  7 
shows  that  although  AOBC  is generally  an  unimportant  source  of  interbank 
exposure  for  U.S.  banks  as  a  whole,  it may  be  an  important  source  of  such 
exposure  for a  few  U.S.  banks. 
FFSC  is  plotted  in  figure  5,  and  the  individual  bank  numbers  are 
reported  in table 8.  As  one  might  expect,  FFSC  shows  the  greatest  variation 
of  all our  interbank-exposure  ratios.  The  seemingly  erratic  behavior  of 
FFSC  may  be  due  in part  to  the  short  maturity of FFS  assets  and  the  way  the 
FFS  is recorded  on  the  call  reports.  The  data  from  the  reports  reflect  the 
position  of  the  variable  on  the  day  the  call  report  is made  and  not  an 
average  quarterly  position.  Because  FFS  tend  to  be  very  short-term  assets, 
the  numbers  reported  as  of  the  day  of  the  call  report  may  not  be 
representative  of  the  true  FFS  position  of  the  banks  in  the  sample. 
Although  this  problem  may  influence  the  numbers  reported,  it should  not 
dominate  the  trends  for  the  groups  or  for  individual  banks  over  time.  It is 
more  likely than  not  that  the  movements  in the  FFSC  over  time  are driven by 
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in  securities  and  in  the  banks'  home  markets.  The  oscillation  of  the 
exposures  around  a  relatively  flat  trend  line over  time  is consistent  with 
market  factors driving FFSC  over  time. 
TOTEXPC,  the  sum  of  the  specific  interbank-exposure  ratios,  is plotted 
in figure  6  and  reported  in table  9.  TOTEXPC  follows  the  same  pattern as 
BDDlC  for  all our  aggregate  bank  groups.  Overall,  TOTEXPC  has  fallen most 
for  the  banks  with more  than  $1  billion in assets and  has  exhibited a slight 
decline or  stayed  the  same  for  the  remainder  of  the  banks.  Thedecrease  in 
TOTEXPC  for  the  large  banks  tends  to  reflect  a  decrease  in the  BDDIC  and 
LDlC  over  the  sample  period.  The  behavior  of  TOTEXPC  for  the  individual 
banks  in each  group  in table 9  confirms  the  results  in figure 6. 
Figures  7  and  8  present  the  degree  of  interbank  exposure  of  U.S.  banks 
to  foreign  banks  (non-U.S.  banks  in the  United States  and  abroad)  and  banks 
domiciled  in foreign  countries  (both  U.S.  and  non-U.S.  banks).  Banks  with 
less  than  $100million  in assets  do  not  report  the  line  items  in the  call 
report  required  to  compute  FORC  and  ABRC,  so  they  are  omitted  from  these 
tables  and  figures.  However,  because  it is unlikely  that  small  banks  have 
much  of  this type of  interbank  exposure,  this omission should  not  affect  the 
analysis.  It  is  interesting  to  look  at  measures  of  foreign  banking 
exposure,  such  as  FOR  and  ABR,  because  this  type  of  interbank  exposure  is 
subject  to  sovereign  risk.  'That  is,  the  claimant  bank  is subject  not  only 
to the  risk of  failure of  the  banks  whose  assets  it holds,  but  also  to the 
risks  associated  with  political  decisions  made  by  foreign  governments. 
Figures  7  and  8  show  that  FORC  and  ABRC  decline  slightly over  the  sample 
period  for  banks  with  less  than  $10  billion  in assets.  For  banks  with 
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greater  rate over  the  sample  period.  Tables  10  and  11  confirm  the  results 
of  the  figures  and  indicate  that  FORC  and  ABRC  may  represent  a  potential 
problem  for  only  a  few  U.S.  banks.  In addition,  anecdotal  evidence,  which 
recent  interbank  claims  data  (Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  table 3.17)  tend  to 
confirm,  suggests  that  these  exposures  may  be  increasing  for  money  center 
banks. 
Before  one  reads  too  much  into  the  relationships  in  the  figures  and 
tables,  we  must  point  out  several  caveats  for  the  results.  First,  the 
numbers  reflect  the  aggregate  interbank  exposure  for  each  bank  (group)  and 
do  not  take  into  account  possible  diversification of  the  bank's  (group's) 
exposure.  A  bank  could  have  a  very  high  exposure  to  other  banks  in  the 
banking  system  but  very  little exposure  to any  one  bank.  Such  a  bank  would 
have  less  interbank-exposure  risk  than  a  comparable  bank  with  less  exposure 
to  the  banking  system  but  a  high  level  of  exposure  to one  bank  (or  a  small 
group  of  banks).  Second,  with  currently  available  data,  we  cannot 
determine  riskiness  of  the  interbank  claims.  There  is  less  reason  to  be 
concerned  about  a  bank's  interbank  exposure  to  a  sound  and  conservatively 
managed  bank  than  the  same  level  of  exposure  to one  of  the  "high-fliers"  of 
the  banking  or  thrift  industries.  Third,  there  are  interbank  claims  on  the 
liability side of  the  balance  sheet  that  offset  some  of  the  asset  exposure. 
Fourth,  to  the  extent  that  domestic  geographic  distribution  of  interbank 
exposure  matters  (@.aL,  exposure  within the  same  clearinghouse  or  within the 
same  Federal  Reserve  District), such  distribution cannot  be  determined  from 
the  currently available data.  (See  table  12.)  Finally, we  cannot  determine 
the  duration of  the  exposure.  Banks  with a high  level  of  interbank exposure 
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risk,  by  duration,  than  banks  with  the  same  level  of  interbank  exposure 
concentrated  in assets with  longer  maturities. 
Overal I,  interbank  exposure,  as  defined  in  this  study  (with  all  its 
inherent  limitations),  does  not  seem  to  be  a  problem  for  U.S.  banks  during 
the  periods  investigated.  Aggregate  exposure  ratios  and  the  majority  of 
individual  bank-exposure  ratios do  not  appear  to  be  at  levels  that  are  high 
enough  for  concern,  and  there  is a  general  flat  or  declining  trend  in our 
measures  of  interbank  exposure  for  banks  as  a  whole.  However,  as  we  readi ly 
admi t , the measures  that  we  are able- to construct  from  cal l  report  data are so 
crude  that  our  interpretations of  the  results are based  more  on  instinct  than 
on  hard  evidence.  On  the  other  hand,  it is clear  from  our  study  that  there 
are  a  few  banks  with  aggregate  interbank  exposure  high  enough  to  warrant 
closer  scrutiny  by  their managements,  shareholders,  and  other  investors,  and, 
at the  time of  their next  supervisory  examination,  by  the  regulators. 
VIII .  Conclusions  and  Policv Recomnendations 
Interbank exposure  is a  form  of sensitivity that  need  not  (but  in the  eyes 
of  some  influential  authorities,  at  least,  potentially  does)  constitute 
contagion or  systemic  risk that  has  significant public policy  implications  for 
the safety and  soundness  of  the banking system. 
We  present  arguments  and  anecdotal  evidence  supporting  three  basic 
hypotheses.  The  first  is that  high  levels  of  interbank  exposure  reduce  the 
safety and  soundness  of  the  banking  system.  This  contagion  risk increases  the 
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banks,  would  result  in a  series  of  bank  failures.  Our  second  hypothesis  is 
that  interbank  exposure  affects  the  abi l i  ty  of  the  FDIC  to  use  market 
discipline  as  a  constraint  on  banks'  risk-taking.  A  reduction  in  the 
independence  of  bank  failures  increases  the  constraints  on  the  FDIC's  ability 
to  dispose  of  insolvent  banks  without  extending  forbearances  to  the  bank's 
uninsured  depositors,  general  creditors,  and  stockholders.  The  third 
hypothesis  is  that  a  rising  level  of  interbank  exposure  is  indicative  of 
reduced  stability of  the  financial  system.  lnterbank  claims  tend  to  rise as 
banks  see  reduced  investment  opportunities  in their  traditional markets  and  as 
entry  into  new  markets  is  precluded  by  either  regulatory  or  competitive 
factors.  As  the  credit  quality  of  nonbank  borrowers  decreases,  banks  will 
increase  indirect  Iending  to  these  and  other  comparable  borrowers  through 
other  banks  as  a  supposedly  safer  alternative  to  direct  Iending. 
Unfortunately,  the  historical  accounts  indicate  that  the  perceived  safety  of 
increased  interbank  lending may  be  a delusion  that  chains  a  greater  number  of 
financial  institutions  together  in a  1980s  version  of  the  medieval  dance  of 
death.  Interbank  lenders  and  borrowers  become  chained  to  each  other  and 
prosper  together  as  long  as  real,  nonfinancial  economic  activity  increases, 
but  they  also  perish  together  if  real,  nonfinancial  economic  activity 
decreases  without  appropriate adjustments  in lenderst  behavior.  Worse  yet,  as 
recent  experience  in  northeastern  real  estate  markets  illustrates,  stories 
about  "credit  crunches"  appear  in the  financial  press  .following declines  in 
real  economic  activity,  and  these  might  constitute  a  signal  of  enough 
political  pressure  to  "ease  up"  so  as  to  deter  regulators  from  pursuing 
necessary  reforms,  such  as  disc  10s i  ng  and  reducing di  rect  interbank exposures. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTo  remedy  problems  associated  with  direct  interbank  exposure,  useful 
solutions might  include the  following measures: 
1)  ÿ he  construction  of  a  data  collection  system  geared  to  measuring 
di  rect  and  some  forms  of  indirect  interbank  exposure.  This  could 
be  done  by  modifying  the  existing  call  reports  or  setting  up  a 
separate  reporting schedule.  As  we  noted  in section  VII,  data  on 
interbank  claims  are  not  collected  now  in a manner  that  allows  us 
to properly measure  and  evaluate  interbank-exposure  risk.  In fact, 
the  remainder  of  our  policy  recomnendations  are  based  on  the 
assumption  that  interbank-exposure  risk can  be  accurately measured, 
in the  future  if  not  at  present.  Some  supervisory  movement  in this 
direction already  is  underway;  beginning  with  the  June  30,  1987, 
cal l  reports,  commercial  banks  have  had  to  report  aggregate  amounts 
of  loans  purchased  from  other  depository  institutions,  as  well  as 
loans  sold  to  other  institutions.='  Obviously,  much  more  sti  l l 
has  to be  done  to  improve  collection of  data on  interbank  exposure, 
but  collection of  data on  loan  participations  purchased and  sold  is 
an  important  first step. 
2)  Excluding  ClPC  and  insured  interbank  deposit  balances  from  the 
measures,  we  suggest  that: 
Banks  be  restricted  to  having  not  more  than  50  percent  of 
their  capital  at  risk  to  any  single  financial  institution 
(including  bank,  thrift,  and  nonbank-financial  ho(ding 
companies)  and  that  they  be  required  to  report  to  their 
primary  supervisor  any  combination  of  direct  and  indirect 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexposures  to any  financial  institution that  exceeds  15  percent 
of  their  primary  capital.  Public disclosure of such  exposures 
-also  would  be  helpful  in  advancing  the  cause  of  market 
discipline.  For  asset  exposures  to  (claims  on)  other 
financial  institutions  in excess  of  15  percent  of  capital, 
offsetting  liability exposure  on  the  claimant  bank's  balance 
sheet  could  be  deducted  when  determining  its net  interbank 
exposure  to  any  one  financial  institution.  All net,  direct 
interbank  exposures  that  exceed  50  percent  of  capital  (in the 
aggregate)  should  be  publicly  disclosed  and  should  be 
scrutinized  by  examiners  as  part  of  the  examinat ion 
131  process .- 
Banks  have  aggregate  interbank-exposure  limits  set  by  their 
primary  regulators.  (Alternative:  banks  should  determine  and 
then  publicly  disclose  their  own  direct  interbank-exposure 
I  imi  ts.)  These  aggregate  exposure  I  imi  ts  should  include  a 
restriction  on  exposure  to  banks  within  the  claimant  bank's 
local  clearinghouse  association  and  separate  limits on  total 
exposure  to  all banks  in the  domestic  banking  system  and  to 
all  foreign  banks  for  each  particular  country  of  origin. 
Because  of  regional,  concentration-of-risk  patterns  that 
emerged  in the  1980s,  it also  might  be  useful  to have  banks 
calculate  and  disclose  aggregate  interbank  exposures  by 
Federal  Reserve  District.  Because  there  is  no  theory  or 
evidence  that  tells us  how  high  to  set  the  aggregate  exposure 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlevels,  we  defer  to banks'  own  publicly disclosed  judgments  or 
to  judgments  of  the  regulators  on  this  issue.  However,  U.S. 
bankers  do  have  experience  in determining  direct  interbank- 
exposure  limits,  both under  Federal  Reserve-sponsored  payments 
system  risk-reduction  initiatives  and  on  their  own 
initiatives,  even  without  Federal  Reserve  involvement  (Clarke 
[1983],  pp.  27-32).  Thus,  the  only  truly novel  aspect  of  this 
proposal  would  be  either  regulatori ly administered  or  pub1 icly 
disclosed  interbank-exposure  limits. 
Because  of  sovereign  credit  risk  for  nationalized  banking 
systems  and  cross-border  currency  transfer  risk  in general,  a 
limit should  be  set  on  the  total  interbank  claims  of  each  U.S. 
bank  on  all  financial  institutions  from  each  foreign  country. 
Limits  also  should  be  set  on  a  bank's  aggregate  interbank 
exposure  to  any  single  region  of  the  world  (such  as  Latin 
America  or  Eastern  Europe).  Historically,  self-imposed  limits 
on  international  interbank  exposure  have  proved  to be  too  weak 
or  too  inconsistently  enforced  to  be  of  practical  use  in 
limiting  loss  when  payment  flows  have  been  interrupted  (Clarke 
119831,  pp.  27-32).  Because  of  the  historical  interplay between 
banks'  cross-border  lending  and  foreign  policy  considerations 
(see  Tolchin  [19901;  Chernow  [19901),  any  regulatory  limits on 
such  regional  lending  might  have  to be  set  in consultation with 
the  Treasury  and  State Departments.  We  believe that  no  domestic 
bank's  aggregate  net  interbank  claims  on  specific  countries  and 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmregions  of  the  world  should  be  allowed  to exceed  the  level  set 
for  the  claimant  bank's  exposure  to  the  largest  (or 
next-largest)  institution  in  its  own  local  clearinghouse 
association. 
Such  measures  would  limit  the  alleged  ripple  effects  of  irrational, 
contagious  bank  failures  and  would  increase  the  safety  and  soundness  of  our 
banking  system.  They  should  allow  the  FDIC  and  other  bank  regulators  to 
exercise  market  discipline  fully  in  deciding  to  allow  large  banks  (or 
interlocked  smaller  banks)  to  fai I  as  a  consequence  of  either  supervisory 
intervention or  rational  bank  runs.  Thus,  the  regulators'  Continental  dilemna 
would  be  either  avoided  or  significantly  diminished.  However,  before  a 
meaningful  system  of  supervision  or  regulation  of  interbank  exposure  can  be 
implemented,  the  definition  of  interbank  exposure  needs  to  be  expanded  to 
include  off-balance-sheet  exposures  and  other  relevant  asset  exposures,  such 
as  holdings  of  stock  and  subordinated  debt  of  other  banks,  that  are  not 
currently available from  call report data. 
This  paper  presents  a  measure  of  interbank  exposure  for  U.S.  banks  from 
March  1984  until March  1990.  Interbank-exposure  ratios  formed  on  aggregated 
data  indicate  that  the  overall  level  of  interbank  exposure  declined  during 
this period.  The  same  ratios formed  on  an  individual-bank  basis  support  this 
conclusion.  Overall,  the  evidence  suggests  that  interbank  exposure  is not  a 
serious  problem.  However,  a  limited number  of banks  have  exposure  ratios that 
are high enough  to warrant  further  investigation by  their  regulators. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Commenting  on  an  earlier  draft  of  this  paper,  Hester  (1987)  observed 
(accurately,  we  believe)  that  the  terminology  we  were  using  then  (and 
that  still  prevails  in  academic  and  policy  discussions)  is  somewhat 
confused.  Hester  wrote  that  "contagion  and  systemic  risks are  medical 
terms  with meanings  which  are quite different.  Contagion  refers  to the 
spread  of disease and  systemic  risk refers to a simultaneous  collapse of 
different  elements  or  organs.  Neither  is  equivalent  to  sensitivity, 
which  [is]  ... the  partial  derivative  of  one  variable  with  respect  to 
another ." 
2.  One  explanation  for  the  lack  of  scale  economies  in banking  found  by 
Bens ton,  Hanweck,  and  Humphrey  ( 1982)  i  s  that  correspondent  bank i  ng 
enables  small  banks  to  capture  some  of  the  efficiencies  of  larger 
banking organizations. 
3.  The  classic  recommendation  regarding  this  type  of  problem  would  be  for 
the  Federal  Reserve,  the  FDIC,  or  another  lender  of  last  resort  to  lend 
freely to banks  with exposure  to bank  A  but not  to  lend so  as  to prevent 
the  market-determined  failure  of  bank  A  itself.  See,  for  example, 
Humphrey  (1989);  Todd  (1988a);  Clarke  (1983);  and  Bagehot  (1873,  p. 
197).  Clarke's  observations  on  the  classic  lender-of-last-resort  theory 
are worth  restatement  here  (1983,  p.  45): 
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assessments  with  risk  would  contribute  to  prudent 
bank i  ng ,  they  do  not  assure  i  t .  So  long  as  banks -- 
especial ly  big banks  --  have  reason  to assume  that 
-  the  monetary  authorities  wi  I I  not  let  them  fai I, 
moral  hazard  remains  a  problem.  Banks  that  adopt 
go-for-broke  strategies  can  bid  up  deposit  rates 
sufficiently  not  only  to  offset  the  increases  in 
insurance  premia  but  also  to attract  investors  who 
are  willing  to  gamble.  To  be  sure,  a  dynamic 
economy  requires  a  willingness  to  take  risks  but 
whether  this  willingness  should  be  found  in banks 
may  be  doubted,  especially  if the  cost  of  faulty 
business  judgment  is borne  by  the  public.  In order 
to  provide  assurance  that  they  would  bear  the  full 
cost  of  risk-taking,  banks  should  therefore  be 
required  not  only  to  pay  risk-related  insurance 
premia  but  also  to  understand  clearly  that  support 
from  the  lender  of  last  resort  will be  provided only 
to solvent  institutions. 
In  recent  years  the  Federal  Reserve  has  paid  l ip 
service  to this  injunction  . .  . but  uncertainty about 
the  precise  position  of  troubled  banks  has  led  to 
slippage  in practice.  In  a  significant  number  of 
cases,  market  reports  of  difficulties  at  an 
institution have  led  to  heavy  outflows  of  uninsured 
deposits  and  to  application  for  credit  from  the 
Discount  Window.  More  often  than  not,  the  Fed  has 
responded  in the  spirit of  "Treat  the  patient  first 
and  ask  questions  about  solvency  later."  Even  then 
the  question  was  not,  "Is  the  institution  solvent 
now?"  but  rather  --  "With  reformed  management  and, 
perhaps,  some  capital  infusion,  does  the  bank  stand 
a  fair  chance  of  becoming  solvent  at  some  point  in 
the  not-too-distant  future?" 
See  Shaffer  (1989)  regarding  the  effect  of  "pooling"  on  joint  failure 
risks. 
5.  See  William  M.  Isaac's  testimony  before  the  House  of  Representatives, 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance  and  Urban Affairs,  Subcommittee  on  Financial 
Institutions,  Supervision,  Regulation  and  Insurance  (U.S.  Congress 
[Hearings]  [1985],  pp.  457-491).  See  also  Wolfson  (1986,  p.  111)  for  a 
comparable  statement  regarding  Continental  by  Comptrol ler  of  the  Currency 
Todd  Conover. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6,  Staff  report, U.S.  Congress  [Hearings]  (1985),  pp.  418-445. 
See  Zweig  (1985).  In  the  Penn  Square  lending  frenzy,  Seafirst  and 
Continental  may  have  relied  substantially  on  Penn  Square's  credit 
evaluations  of  the  loans  in which  they  participated,  thereby  creating what 
can  be  termed  "indirect  interbank  exposure."  Indirect  interbank  exposure 
represents  a  form  of  agency  problem  in the  spirit of  Jensen  and  Me'ckling 
(1976).  However,  our  study  is concerned  primarily  with  direct  interbank 
exposure.  See  also  Wolfson  (1986,  pp.  99-102,  106-113)  regarding  the 
legacy  of Penn  Square. 
8.  Regardless  of one's  views  on  the  "real  billst1  doctrine  in monetary  policy, 
a  macroeconomi~  issue,  it remains  a  bedrock  principle  of  safe  and  sound 
banking,  a  microeconomi~  issue,  that  only  "real  bills1' should  be  treated 
as  "prime1'  bankers'  acceptances  of  the  types  normally  eligible  for 
discount  or purchase by  a central  bank  (Todd  [1988b];  Hawtrey  [1932]). 
9.  Off-balance-sheet  risks,  such  as  interest-rate  swaps,  are  additional 
sources  of  interbank-exposure  risk  in  the  banking  system  that  are 
captured,  in aggregate  form  only,  by  the  reporting  schedules  that  banks 
currently  file with  their  regulators.  Also,  within  the  Federal  Reserve 
System,  on-line  access  to complete  call  report  data  across  district  lines 
is not  as  readily  available as  persons  outside  the  System  might  suppose. 
Some  measures  of off-balance-sheet  risks are  summarized  in table 2. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm10.  There  is  a  form  of  interbank  exposure  (some  of  it offsetting)  on  the 
liability side  of  banks1  ledgers,  including,  for  example,  claims due  to 
other  banks.  Such  exposure,  also  referred  to as  "funding  risk,"  increases 
the  contagion  risk  regarding  banks'  funding  sources.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity and  manageability,  and  because  funding  risk  is already  a widely 
recognized  and  researched  problem  (see,  for  example,  Wolfson  [1986],  pp. 
106-121),  we  usually  excluded  liability  items  and  concentrated  on 
interbank  asset  exposures  instead. 
11.  Anecdotal  evidence  (which  recent  data  in  aggregated  form  in  Federal 
Reserve  Bulletin table  3.17  tend  to  confirm)  suggests  that,  among  money 
center  institutions,  interbank  exposure  may  have  increased  since  the 
fai  lure of  Continental .  See  table 3  for  a  l ist of  correspondent  balances 
and  interbank deposits  held by  selected  large banks. 
12.  See  Fraust  (1987). 
We  base  our  suggested  50  percent  of  capital  Iimit  on  net,  aggregate, 
interbank  exposures  on  the  FDIC's  citation  of  50  percent  capital 
impairment  as  one  of  its standard  measures  of  the  purported  impact  of 
Continental's  failure (1984)  on  its correspondent  banks  (see  footnote  5). 
The  15  percent  reporting or  disclosure  limitation is not  based  on  any  rule 
or  evidence,  but  it  matches  the  15  percent  of capital  per  customer  lending 
limit  that  generally  applies  to  bank  customers.  Clarke,  in  an 
unpublished  letter  (June  20,  1990)  commenting  on  a  draft  of  this  paper, 
offered the  following observations: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI'm  not  at  all  confident  in  the  efficacy  of 
such . [voluntary,  sel  f-imposed]  I  imi  ts.  Recent 
experience  in  the  real  estate  market  in  the 
[Northeast]  ...  suggests  that  the  banks  have 
already  forgotten  the  lessons  of  their disastrous 
Latin  American  loans.  So,  in  the  absence  of 
anything  better,  I'm  inclined  to  stick with  the 
p  roposa l  s  on  pp .  43-48  of  my  [  19831  paper.  But 
what  can  you  do  if  you  get  regulators  like those 
in  the  FSLlC  during  the  '80s  and  senators  like 
the  wicked  five and  a president  and  Congress  that 
think the market  can  do  no  wrong? 
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Markets and  Bankina System Stabi litv 
Although  it is widely  accepted  that  a  free-market  solution to the  problem 
of  failing banks  would  be  the  most  efficient one,  there  are  some  who  would 
dispute  the  claim  that  the  market  solution  is stable  at  all,  let  alone  the 
most  stable  solution.  (See  Campbell  and  Minsky  [19871;  Corrigan  [1989];  and 
Guttentag and  Herring [1986,  19881.)  Such  reservations about  the  stability of 
markets  (at  least  of  financial  markets)  may  be  traced  to the claim that  market 
solutions  result  in more  short-run  volatility  than  regulatorily  determined 
solutions.  In the  case  of  banking,  bank  failure  rates  and  the  frequency  of 
runs  on  insolvent  institutions  are  proxies  for  volatility.  Thus,  as  the 
argument  goes,  the  more  volatile a  banking  system  is,  the  less  stable  it is. 
One  flaw  in such  arguments  is that  they  rely  too  heavily  on  one  aspect  of 
systemic  stability -- short-run  volatility -- and  ignore  other  more  important 
aspects.  A  second  flaw  is that  such  arguments  focus  on  short-run  phenomena 
rather  than  on  long-run  evidence,  even  though  stability  is a  concept  that 
truly has  meaning  only  in a  long-run  context.  In other  words,  volatility of 
flows  of  funds,  or  liquidity,  draws  more  academic  and  supervisory  attention 
(wrongly,  I  think)  than  sustainability  and  stability of outcomes  (for example, 
maintenance  of  solvency,  or positive net worth  on  a market-value  basis),  which 
are capital-stock  concepts. 
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properties  that  a  market  or  an  economic  system  possesses.  In  the  simplest 
terms,  one  can  think  of  the  financial  system  as  a  ball  rolling down  a  path. 
The  first  condition  for  stability  is directed  momentum:  Yhen  there  are  no 
outside  forces  operating  on  the  ball,  it follows  its equilibrium path.  When 
an  exogenous  force,  for  example,  new  information arriving  in the  market,  acts 
on  the  ball,  it deviates  from  its path.  How  far  the  ball deviates  and  how 
quickly  it returns  to  the  equi l  ibrium  path  are  also  factors  that  affect  the 
stability  of  the  system.*  Volatility  is  related  to  only  one  of  these 
conditions:  that  is,  it is a measurement  of  how  far  and  how  often  the  ball 
deviates  from  some  path.  Measures  of  volatility give us  no  information on  how 
quickly  the  ball  returns  to  the  equilibrium  path and,  indeed,  cannot  tell us 
whether  the  ball returns to  its path at all. 
Market  systems  naturally exhibit  more  short-run  volatility  than  regulated 
ones  because market  forces  continually make  corrective adjustments  in order  to 
return  their  bal l  to  its equi l  ibrium  path.  In regulated  systems,  corrective 
actions  tend  to be  deferred  (supervisors  pretend  that  the  ball has  not  really 
deviated  from  its  path),  creating  an  environment  in  which  there  are 
substantial  periods  of  nonadjustment,  with  substantial  adjustments  made 
occasionally.  Large-scale  adjustments  often  occur  at  the  expense  of  having 
the  ball  deviate  farther  and  farther  from  its  equilibrium  path  in  the 
interim.  Hence,  the  ball might  stray  from  its equilibr,ium path more  often and 
for  longer  periods of  time. 
*For  simplicity,  the  discussion  here  treats  the  path  of  the  rolling ball  as 
though  it  were  fixed.  However,  the  analysis  also  is valid when  the  path  is 
allowed  to  evolve  over  time  and  to  be  affected by.  the  same  forces  as  those 
acting on  the ball. 
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equivalent  to  the  difference  in exchange-rate  adjustments  under  floating and 
fixed  exchange-rate  regimes.  Under  a  floating  exchange-rate  regime,  supply 
and  demand  factors  in  markets  cause  nearly  continuous  adjustments  of  the 
exchange  rate and,  at  times,  a  high  level  of  short-run  volatility.  Under  a 
fixed exchange-rate  regime,  the  official exchange  rate  is maintained  for  long 
periods,  with  large  adjustments  made  periodically.  Short-run  volatility 
measured  by  movements  in exchange  rates  typically would  be  low  in a  fixed-rate 
regime,  while actual  volatility in the  foreign exchange  markets  might  be  quite 
high.  Hence,  regulated  systems  exhibit  less  short-run  volatility  than  market 
systems,  but  conclusions  about  the  relative  stability  of  the  two  systems, 
based  solely  on  "measured"  short-run  volatility,  may  be  as  misleading  as 
comparisons  of  apples  and  oranges  and,  in any  case,  are  subject  to  the  same 
"flows  of  funds  versus  capital stock"  criticism mentioned  above. 
To  the  extent  that  regulated  systems  achieve  less  short-run  volatility by 
suppressing  the  corrective  forces  inherent  in markets,  the  greater  is  the 
probability  that,  over  time,  a  major  adjustment  would  be  needed.  This  is 
analogous  to  the  absence  of small  earthquakes  along a  fault  line, which  allows 
stress  to  build up  and  thereby  increases  the  probability  that  a  major  quake 
eventually  will  occur.  Small  quakes,  like  self-correcting  market  forces, 
relieve  the  pressures  that  accumulate  over  time.  Suppression  of  these  forces 
through  regulatory  interference  allows  the  pressure  to  rise and  increases  the 
magnitude  and  violence  of  the  resulting adjustment.  Therefore,  over  the  long 
run,  regulated  financial  systems  tend  to display more  volatility and  to stray 
farther  from  and  adjust  less  quickly  to  the  equilibrium  path  than 
market-oriented  financial  systems. 
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depository  institutions. 
ClPCC  =  CIPC/CAPITAL 
BDDl  =  Balances  due  from  depository  institutions. 
BDDIC  =  BDDI/CAPITAL 
LDI  =  Loans  to depository  institutions. 
LDlC  =  LDI/CAPITAL 
A00  =  Acceptances  of other  banks. 
AOBC  =  AOB/CAPITAL 
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FFSC  =  FFS/CAPITAL 
TOTEXP  =  CBDl  +  LDI  +  AOB  +  FFS. 
TOTEXPC  =  TOTEXP/CAPITAL 
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FOR  =  Exposure  to foreign banks  in the U.S.  and  abroad.  FOR  consists of 
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acceptances  of foreign banks. 
FORC  =  FOR/CAPITAL 
ABR  =  Exposure  to U.S.  and  non-U.S.  banks  domiciled  in foreign countries.  ABR 
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acceptances  of banks  abroad. 
ABRC  =  ABWCAPITAL 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable  12:  What  the Federal Reserve Used  to Publish 
COMMERCIAL DANICS  1435 
RESERVES AND  LIA  IL~ES  OF  COMMERCIAL  BANKS. BY CLAS FES~ 
nn  rr  lllons of dollm] 
Demand deposiu  Tlmc dcposiu 
Certl-  Indl- 
call date  Re-  mestlc  ad-  serve 
Dank8  banks.  iurted7  ,-,,  F~~. 
mcstic~  etgn'  ctc.  tlons  --- 
Mrnlhcr.  total 







Scpt. 27 ...  .I 16,038) 2;932I  6.761 I 
Kr-. York C1lv:S 
1941-Dcc.  31 .... 
194s-~CC.  31.. .. 
1947-Dcc.  31. ... 
I9SR-ncc.  31 .... 
1959-kc.  31 ...  . 
1960-Dcc.  31 .... 
1961-Junc  30 .... 
Scot. 27.. 1.1 
8 llrcakdowns  of loan.  Investment.  and denorlt cla*rlllc 
available prior to  1947: aummary hguru for earlier dater 
preceding table. 
Por a  d~rcusslon  of rcvlslon  In  loan schedule.  see the  vrm  lor 
Juruary 1960. p.  12. 
1  Gntral reserve city banks.  * Dcginning wi~h  1942. excludu reciprocal bank balancer. 
YThrouph  1960.  demand  dcpositr  othcr  than  Interharc  and  J.S. 
Government. lers cash items reported u in process of collcctic I:  begin  ~ng 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bulletin  -47  (December  1961) ,  p.  '1435. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 1:  Cash Items in the Process of  Collection 
Percent of capital 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $100 million 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  ...  .  .. .  .  .  ..  .  ..  .  Assets $1 to $10 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $1  0 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financ~al  Institutions Exam~natlon  Council's Reports of Condition 8 Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2:  Balances Due from Depository lnstitutio'ns 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $100 million 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to  $300 million 
- - - - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  ..  .  .  ..  .. .  ..  ...  .  Assets $1 to  $10 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $1  0 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financial lnstitutlons Examination Council's Reports of  Condition 8 Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 3:  Loans to Depository Institutions 
Percent of capital 
140 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $1  00 million 
-  - - -  Assets $1  00 to $300 million 
- - - - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  ,  .  .  .  -.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Assets $1 to $10 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $1 0 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financial lnst~tutions  Examination Council's Reports of Condition & Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 4:  Acceptances of  Other Banks 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $100 million 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
- - - - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  ...  ..  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Assets $1 to $10 billion 
Percent of  cap~tal 











www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 5:  Federal Funds Sold and Repurchase Agreements Purchased 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $100 million 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
- - - - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Assets $1 to $1  0 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $10 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financial lnstitut~ons  Examination Council's Reports of  Condition 8 Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 6:  Total Measured Exposure 
Percent of ca~ital 
All banks 
- - -  Assets <  $1 00 million 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
- - ,  - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Assets $1 to $10 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $1  0 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's Reports of Condition 8 Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 7:  Exposure to Foreign Banks Abroad and Their U.S. Branches 
All banks 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
,  - ,  - ,  - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
................. Assets $1 to $10 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $10 billion 














-  L. 
-  \ 
-1 
- 
.............. .. .  ....  -.- 
...  .  .  -.  .....  .  ... 
I  -..  --.  '  -.  ..  - 
\ 
------_  ---  ----- 
I  I  I  72/87 
I 
12188  12/89  3/90  93  3  a4  12,~~  12/85  12.86 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 8:  Exposure to  U.S. and Non-U.S. Banks Domiciled in Foreign Countries 
Percent of ca~ital 
All banks 
-  - - -  Assets $100 to $300 million 
- - - - - - - - Assets $300 million to $1 billion 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Assets $1 to $1  0 billion 
-.  . -  Assets >  $1  0 billion 
SOURCE:  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's Reports of Condition & Income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm